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 ABSTRACT 





This dissertation investigates the sources of inefficiencies in financial sector and effects of 
these inefficiencies on the economy.  
In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of asset prices on financial institutions in a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model including bank defaults and related agency costs. I find that 
pecuniary externalities exist in asset prices as decentralized banks do not internalize the effects 
of their lending on asset price distributions. These externalities lead to excess risk taking and 
leverage in the financial sector. Excess risk taking behavior deteriorates welfare of both 
depositors and banks in a stochastic economy. I show that a restricted social planner is able to 
improve welfare by limiting the leverage in the economy. In planner’s problem, robust banking 
system is more resilient against the shocks. This in turn creates more stable economy with lower 
bankruptcy costs and increases welfare. Thus, I show that significant economic gains are 
possible with appropriate regulations in the financial sector. 
In the second chapter, I examine the welfare effects of pecuniary asset price externalities 
using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. I show that decentralized financial system 
is socially inefficient due to pecuniary price externalities. I compare various regulations using 
quantitative welfare analysis. I find that bailout policies cause moral hazard problems and induce 
excess risk taking. Therefore, such policies worsen the inefficiency. However, macro-prudential 
policies limit the leverage and provide resilience against the systemic shocks. Thus, these 
policies mitigate distortions and improve welfare. Furthermore, I show that combination of 
bailout and prudential reserve requirement policies is pareto better than other regulations. 
Finally, I introduce credit default swaps (CDS) into the model and find that CDSs can mitigate 
the distortions. But the benefits of CDSs are limited to the size of systemic shocks. If systemic 
shocks are big enough, CDS linkages will make crisis contagious among the financial 
institutions.  
In the third chapter, I analyze the impacts of asymmetric information and imperfect 
monitoring on financial sector using a single period model with agency costs. I solve the model 
analytically comparing different levels of imperfect monitoring on heterogeneous banks. I find 
that information asymmetries and noises in monitoring encourage risk taking behaviors among 
the banks with low loan returns. I also show that these asymmetries cause inefficiently low 
lending among banks with high loan returns. In the extension of the model, I analyze 
government’s incentive to prevent asymmetric information using regulatory tools such as stress 
tests. I analytically show that if the government is elected for short term and the rate of low 
return banks is high in the economy, government won’t have incentive to announce real type of 
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Chapter 1                                                       




Financial intermediaries such as commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, etc. are 
crucial institutions in the effort to decrease inefficiency and risk in economy. The financial crisis 
in 2008, exacerbated by the excessive risk-taking and overborrowing of banks and their 
subsequent bailouts stressed the importance of the banks’ structure. In their paper of 1958, 
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller suggested that financial structure doesn’t matter. The M-M 




fragile institutions due to their liquidity requirements at all times. The 2008 financial crisis 
showed that both allocation of assets and their pricing in financial institutions’ balance sheets are 
crucial to managing risk. If banks hold similar asset types, sudden and unexpected fall of prices 
cause illiquidity and systemic risk among high leveraged banks. Contagious effects of asset price 
changes might disrupt entire financial system as in the crisis of 2008. Therefore, to prevent 
possible future financial crises, it is essential to re-examine the effects of asset prices on banks’ 
risk taking decisions and their balance sheets by considering the relationships within the whole 
economy.  
This paper presents analysis of how asset prices affect banks’ leverage level and default risk 
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. I show that under competitive 
markets pecuniary asset price externalities lead individual banks to high risk levels and over-
borrowing at social level. The main contribution of the paper is to show the existence of such 
pecuniary externalities in a model allowing banks’ defaults with endogenous borrowing limits 
and to provide quantitative assessments for this model.  
This paper develops an infinite period model with incomplete financial markets. The key 
features of the model are endogenous borrowing limits, existence of bank defaults and related 
agency costs.1 Banks can borrow from depositors with standard debt contract using their initial 
                                                           
1 Literature on economic models including financial intermediaries is started with finite period models and the 
focus was on the relationship between lender and entrepreneur. Townsend (1979) introduced costly monitoring 
problem. Then literature separated into two different paths. First branch (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Gale and 
Hellwig (1985)) concentrated on credit rationing in equilibrium while the other one tried to explain role and 
existence of financial intermediaries (Boyd&Prescott (1985), Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986)). Diamond 





capital as partial collateral. Unlike the existing literature of pecuniary externalities, partial 
collateralization mechanism imposes endogenous borrowing limits and allows default of banks 
in the equilibrium. Banks give loans to capital good firms with perfect state contingent contract 
or in other words equity debt. Capital good firms sell their capital to consumption good firms in a 
competitive market and transfer their revenues to the banks. At the end of the period, banks’ 
shareholders decide how much of the banks’ profit will be used as dividend and as next period’s 
initial capital.  
In the model, banks have access only to non-contingent debt contracts in deposit markets. 
Borrowing rates are ex-ante endogenously determined in the markets with respect to supply and 
demand for deposits and banks’ leverage levels. If banks’ leverage is high, markets will ask 
higher interest rate to insure against the excess default risk. In this framework, banks will default 
with limited commitment if their revenues are not adequate to pay their debt at the end of the 
period. In case of default, there is costly state verification (Townsend ,1979) and some of banks’ 
revenues are lost as agency cost. 
At the end of each period, banks ex-ante decide on the next period’s lending and leverage 
levels. While giving their decisions, banks are exposed to both idiosyncratic and systemic risks. 
The source of idiosyncratic risks is the uncertainty in capital good firms’ productivities and such 
risks create heterogeneity among the banks. On the other hand the cause of systemic risk is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1984) monitoring decision was ex-ante, while in Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson 






uncertainty in capital good prices and it affects all banks’ portfolios. Banks are fully rational and 
they correctly perceive these risks associated with their lending decisions. Nevertheless atomistic 
banks do not internalize their contribution to asset prices and impose pecuniary externality on 
each other. This prevents atomistic banks to use the right asset price distribution in their ex-ante 
decisions, and induces them to take excessive systemic risk.  
In the private equilibrium, I show that atomistic banks undervalue the gains from lower 
leverage levels by ignoring the general equilibrium effects on price distribution. I analyze the 
problem using a restricted social planner that faces similar constraints in private equilibrium. I 
find that even a restricted social planner can make all the agents better off by choosing lower 
leverage levels. I show that decline in lending and capital goods supply raises capital goods 
prices. It improves marginal profitability of the banks and thus their default risk becomes lower 
than their expectations. Furthermore since banks are less risky, spreads in their borrowing rates 
decline and their profitability increases more. Therefore inefficiency in the economy decreases as 
it suffers less from bankruptcy costs. On the other hand, risk averse depositors are better off as 
their income stream becomes less volatile with more robust banking system against shocks.  
Therefore a restricted planner is able to mitigate the distortions in the decentralized equilibrium 
and achieve a pareto efficient allocation. 
The model in this paper builds on the literature of macroeconomics models with financial 
frictions described by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). These papers and following work in the literature introduced 




macroeconomic shocks.2 They compared the result with the first best solution where frictions 
don’t exist. This paper converts the single period problem in Yildiz (2011) into the general 
equilibrium model using the similar approach in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). In order to focus 
on relations between asset prices and banking sector, I eliminate the monetary authority and all 
other nominal frictions (price frictions) from the model. Different than the literature, I use second 
order approximation which could be crucial in welfare comparisons. Furthermore, I compare the 
competitive equilibrium with social planner’s solution, in which financial constraints in private 
equilibrium still exist (second best), instead of first best benchmark.  
The paper is also related to the literature on generic inefficiency of competitive equilibrium 
under incomplete markets (Hart, 1975; Stiglitz, 1982; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986). 
The more recent contributions in this literature (Lorenzoni, 2008; Korinek, 2011; Jeanne and 
Korinek, 2011; Bianchi, 2010) analyzed the role of pecuniary externalities in the inefficiencies of 
decentralized equilibrium under financial frictions. Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2011) used 
finite period model in which entrepreneurs borrow in the first period and face the risk of binding 
financial constraints in the following period. Entrepreneurs’ defaults are excluded by allowing 
                                                           
2 Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) mentioned how competitive environment can increase risk taking 
behavior. Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003) explained in their book possible ways of setting up general equilibrium 
mechanism with a banking system. However, until the 2008 financial crisis, importance of intermediaries has been 
largely underestimated and they were modeled simply as transmission channels of credits. After the crisis, recent 
studies added financial intermediaries into the DSGE models more in details (Iacoviello (2005), Goodfriend & 
McCallum (2007), Van den Heuvel (2008), Curdia and Woodford (2009), Christiano (2010), Dib (2010) and Gerali 
(2010)). All these papers examined the effect of bank values on risk taking behavior in a dynamic model but the loan 
and deposit markets were not micro founded. Gertler and Karadi (2011) diverted from previous DSGE models and 





the fire sales of productive assets. In financially binding states, fire sales cause pecuniary 
externalities in asset prices and this is ex-ante undervalued by atomistic entrepreneurs. Pecuniary 
externalities exist only in fire sales of productive assets because entrepreneurs are not allowed to 
sell their production in the markets. In this paper, by contrast, all production goods can be sold in 
the markets, and furthermore, banks will default if they can’t pay their debt. Thus, I am able to 
analyze effects of pecuniary externalities in all states, and moreover, I show that generic 
inefficiencies of decentralized equilibrium still exist without amplification effects of fire sales in 
binding states.  
Bianchi (2010) and Jeanne and Korinek (2011) analyzed similar pecuniary externalities 
using open economy DSGE models. In these papers, insiders borrow from outsiders and their 
default is excluded by full collateralization. Borrowing limits depend on asset values with 
exogenous parameters. Borrowing limits are binding only in bad states and amplify the effects of 
crisis by depressing the asset prices more. Atomistic agents overborrow by ignoring pecuniary 
externalities and this is the source of inefficiency in the economy. In these studies default is not 
allowed and pecuniary externality exists only in financially constrained states. Furthermore, 
outsiders’ utilities are excluded by open economy assumption in welfare analysis. In this paper, 
by contrast, there is partial collateralization in a closed economy and borrowing limits are 
endogenously determined in the market. Thus, I can analyze bank defaults and consider the 
welfare of all agents in the model. Moreover, in this study, pecuniary externalities exist in all 




The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the benchmark model. 
Section 3 characterizes the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the social planner’s 
problem. Section 5 presents the quantitative analysis including sensitivity analysis and section 6 
concludes. 
1.2 The Model 
The model is a closed economy DSGE model and it consists of continuum of agents with 
unit mass. Basic structure of the model as follows: There are two types of atomistic agents; 
depositors (fraction 1- η) and banks’ shareholders (fraction η). Depositors are the identical 
households living forever. They work, save and consume. Shareholders are the owners of the 
banks and each shareholder has shares in a specific bank. Shareholders have two sources of 
income; labor income and profit of the banks. They can either consume or save by investing in 
banks as capital. Both shareholders and banks are heterogeneous in terms of their initial capital.3 
Banks’ managements are different than shareholders. They have short term, one period, contract 
and their objective, given the initial capital, is to maximize banks’ profits at the end of each 
period. At the end of each period, banks borrow from depositors to invest in next period’s capital 
good production. While borrowing, banks’ managements solve the financial contract problem.  
Since financial contract is just one period in length, it is explained separately from general 
                                                           
3Keeping track of variables’ mean instead of their distribution is adequate due to the assumption of atomistic 





equilibrium model. There are two types of firms in the model; capital and consumer good firms. 
Capital good firms generate demand for bank’s loans. On the other hand, consumer good firms 
provide wage income for agents and generate demand for capital goods.   
1.2.1 Financial Contract 
Financial contract is the standard debt contract between banks and depositors with limited 
commitment of the banks and it limits the banks’ borrowing endogenously (Williamson, 1986; 
Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997). Financial contract generates a supply curve for capital goods and 
optimality conditions of the contract are embedded into the general equilibrium model in the 
following sections. 
Banks have two sources for lending; deposits (dt) and initial capital (wt).  Atomistic 
depositors are the only suppliers of deposits. Depending on the average expected return (at) from 
each unit of deposit, depositor saves std  unit of consumption good and distributes his savings 
among the banks. Law of large numbers allows them to insure against idiosyncratic risk of the 
banks’ lending activities. But depositors are still exposed to the banks’ default risk due to 
systemic risk. Depositors can observe leverage ratio and estimate the default probability of the 
banks. Thus, in the contract, depositors ask spread over risk free rate to insure them against 
default risk. Based on similar reasoning, banks face with different interest rate for each level of 
leverage in their optimization problem.  
There is perfect competition in banking sector and banks optimize next period’s expected 




saving. Next period, banks pay interest rate rd when they do not default. When banks default, 
depositors get all the remaining capital and pay the bankruptcy cost, defined as monitoring and 
liquidation costs. In the deposit markets, dtr and at clear the market and equalize total saving of 
depositors to total deposit demand from the banks, st t(1-η)d =ηd .
4 
Banks’ revenues depend on the performance of their investment in capital good firms. 
Capital good firms’ initial endowment is zero. In order to produce, they need to borrow lt units of 
loan. There is one to one match between banks and firms. Each firm borrows only from a 
specific bank. Firms’ technology is linear, ntlt. nt is the productivity factor and randomly 
distributed over the interval L H[n ,n ]  with the density function f(nt), assumed uniform. Both 
banks and capital good firms don’t know productivity level before production. The banks have 
perfect monitoring skills over firms. The contract between firms and the banks is assumed 
perfectly state contingent debt contract similar to issuing equity for debt. Capital good firms sell 
capital goods to consumption good firms at price qt and transfer all their returns to the banks.  
If bank’s revenues are not enough to pay its liabilities to depositors (qtntlt < r
ddt), it will 
default. Productivity parameter of capital good firms is crucial to determine default risk. There 
exists a threshold level of n such that any realization of productivity below this threshold causes 
default.  
                                                           
4 Deposit demand is different among the heterogeneous banks. But assumption of law of large numbers allows 
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%                                                                                                                               (1.1) 
Banks’ default probability is the cumulative distribution function of n at the threshold level, 
tF(n )% . Under the financial contract with given qt+1, banks’ expected profit (in terms of 
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Figure 1.1 displays the profit of decentralized bank as a function of lending under 
benchmark calibration given in quantitative analysis section. As it is also shown in Appendix A, 
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where Bt+1π  is the bank’s return from each unit of lending in terms of capital good. Similarly 
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where Dt+1π  is the depositors’ return from each unit of lending in terms of capital good. At 
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l
max  E q l π ,  subject to E q l π a d≥                                                                  (1.4) 
Depositors are identical and their participation constraint is always binding. It is assumed 
that returns are attractive enough to convince banks to borrow. Therefore, banks’ participation 
constraint is always satisfied and can be ignored while solving the optimization problem. It is 
important to mention that shareholders own the banks but it is the bank’s management who is in 
charge and solves the contract problem. Since managements’ employment contract is short term, 
their goal is to maximize the next period profits and they ignore further future profits (agency 
problem). This induces risk taking behavior of banks as future losses in case of possible defaults 
are ignored in the financial contract. 
1.2.2 General Equilibrium Model 
In the general equilibrium model, infinitely-lived, identical, atomistic depositors’ preference 
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∑                                                                                                                          (1.5) 
In this expression, β is the discount factor and utility of depositor has the constant-relative-
risk-aversion (CRRA) form. Each period, depositors allocate their incomes between saving and 
consumption according to budget constraint given by:  
s D d D




where Dtc  is the consumption, ht is the labor supply and w
d
t is the real wage. Labor supply is 
assumed constant to focus on financial relations. The second term at the right side of the budget 
equation is the return from savings. Since depositors are identical it is calculated by averaging 
the total payments from the banks.  
Banks’ shareholders have two sources of income; banks’ profits and wage income. At the 
end of each period, they decide how much of the income to consume and reinvest in banks. Their 
reinvestments are used as initial capital for banks’ next period operations. In order to induce 
shareholders’ consumption and thus banks’ borrowing in the model, I assumed that shareholders 
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where Btc  
denotes shareholder’s time t consumption and γ  (0,1)∈  denotes the additional 
discount rate. Shareholders supply constant labor each period and this allows them to enter the 
banking system next period even if they default. Shareholders’ budget constraint is given by: 
B B B
t+1 t t t t tw +c q l π +w≤                                                                                                                    (1.8) 
where t+1w is bank’s capital in next period and 
B
tw  is the shareholder’s wage.  
Consumption good producers buy capital from capital goods firm and hire labor from 
depositors and shareholders. Capital is fully depreciated at the end of each period. Their 
production technology is given by: 
H H1-α-α αα




where θt denotes the stochastic productivity parameter, Kt denotes the aggregate supply of 
capital goods, Ht denotes the aggregate supply of depositors’ labor and η denotes the aggregate 
supply of shareholders’ labor.  
1.3 Equilibrium 
1.3.1 Optimality Conditions 
In the financial contract (1.4), bank’s problem at time t is to choose lt+1 to maximize its 
expected profit subject to depositor’s participation constraint. The optimality conditions require5: 
2 L 2 B
t+1 t+1 t+1
t+1 t+1H L H L B '
t+1
(n ) -(n ) n π
q (n-µ +µ )=a
2(n -n ) n -n π
% %
                                                                                 (1.10) 
D
t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1q l π =a d                                                                                                                         (1.11) 
where n  is the expected return. Optimality condition (1.10) equates marginal profit of bank 
from an extra unit of lending to the marginal cost of borrowing. It determines the threshold level 
of n, t+1n% , independent of bank’s capital. Thus optimal threshold level of each bank is same. 
Equation (1.11) is the binding participation constraint of depositors and it implies that the 
interest rate is the function of bank’s leverage ratio. As the threshold level of n depends on 
interest rate and leverage ratio in equation (1.1), optimality conditions (1.10 and 1.11) imply that 
                                                           





all banks choose same leverage ratio in the financial contract.6 It allows great simplification in 
the solution of the general equilibrium model while preserving the heterogeneity among the 
banks.    
In the general equilibrium model, depositors choose the stochastic processes { }D st t+1 t 0c ,d ≥  to 
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The optimality condition (1.12) is the euler equation. Expression in the brackets is the 
depositor’s next period’s return from extra unit of saving.  
Shareholders choose the stochastic processes { }Bt t+1 t 0c , w ≥ to maximize their utility (1.7) 
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6 Detailed proof is given in Appendix A.1. 
 





Equation (1.14) is the euler equation for the shareholders. Expression at the right side of 
equation is the bank’s return from extra unit of capital.  
There are four markets; deposit, labor, capital goods and consumption goods. Competition 
in the factor markets implies that wages and capital good prices are equal to their marginal 
products: 
d Bt t
t H t H
t t
Y Y
w (1-α-α )    and   w =α
H η
=                                                                                     (1.16) 
H H1-α-α αα-1
t t t tq =αθ (K ) (H ) (η)                                                                                                       (1.17) 
Technology parameter of the consumption good firms, θt, is the source of systemic risk in 
the economy via capital good prices.  
Labor, deposit, capital goods and consumption goods market clearing conditions are given 
by8: 
t tH =(1-η)h                                                                                                                        (1.18) 
t tK =ηnl                                                                                                                             (1.19) 
s
t t(1-η)d =ηd                                                                                                                       (1.20) 
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1.3.2 Equilibrium Definition  
There are five state variables in the decentralized optimization problem. At period t, banks 
and depositors decide on next period’s lending (lt+1) and starting capital (wt+1). In deposit 
markets, depositor’s average expected future return (at+1) is determined to clear the deposit 
market. Similarly deposit interest rate ( dt+1r ) is determined to insure the depositors. The other 
state variable is the technology of consumption good firms. Rational agents perceive actual 
levels of aggregate lending and capital. They estimate asset price using equation (1.17). 
A decentralized competitive equilibrium for this economy is defined by interest rate dt+1r , 








tc , wt+1, lt+1, dt+1, 
Kt+1, tn%  where they are the functions of (
d
tr , at, lt,, wt, θt) and satisfy the following: 
(i) Financial contract optimality conditions (equation 1.10 and 1.11). 
(ii) Depositors’ optimality conditions (equation 1.12 and 1.13). 
(iii) Shareholders’ optimality conditions (equation 1.14 and 1.15). 
(iv) Market clearing conditions (equation 1.16 to 1.21). 





1.4 Social Planner 
In the decentralized equilibrium, atomistic agents take aggregate variables as given, 
particularly total lending (Lt+1). While solving the financial contract, individual banks don’t 
internalize their contribution to total lending (dLt+1/dlt+1=0) which implies that banks ignore the 
effects of their actions on the capital good’s price distribution (dqt+1/dlt+1=0). Thus atomistic 
banks overvalue the marginal gains from lending in their optimality condition (1.10). This 
induces atomistic banks to take excess risk by lending more, and hence high default rates are 
observed at the decentralized equilibrium.  
1.4.1 Planner with Full Capability 
Planner who can arbitrarily redistribute the funds between agents in the economy can 
implement the first best solution. Planner perceives the bankruptcy as the source of inefficiency 
since resources are spent on inefficient activities such as monitoring costs. As planner is capable 
of transferring money between agents, it can eliminate defaults and bankruptcy costs in the 
equilibrium. Social planner’s problem with full capability is formulated as:  
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where superscript ‘DE” refers to decentralized equilibrium and B DE(U )  represents the 
lifetime utility level of average shareholder in decentralized equilibrium. Solution of the 
planner’s problem and its optimality conditions are given in Appendix C.  Simulation results 
given in the quantitative analysis section show that social planner’s allocation constitutes a 
pareto improvement both in the steady state (economy without shocks) and in the stochastic 
environment. Social planner chooses higher level of lending compared to decentralized 
equilibrium as it can prevent defaults with ex-post transfers. Therefore it proves that 
decentralized equilibrium is not the first best solution and economy can be potentially better off. 
1.4.2 Planner with Restricted Capability 
In the previous section, I describe the planner’s problem with full capability in which 
financial contracts and agency costs are irrelevant. But, due to the excess capability of planner, it 
is not a suitable reference point for possible government regulations. Therefore, in the remainder 
of the paper, I assume planner’s abilities are limited. I suppose that planner has control only over 
the banking sector and it can’t make ex-post transfers to the banks and depositors9.  I assume that 
planner has regulatory tools to control the banks’ lending in the financial contract. Thus planner 
can interfere only in financial contracts on behalf of the banking sector.  
The social planner solves the financial contract problem (1.4) by internalizing effects of 
lending decisions on asset prices. The optimization problem is formulated as: 
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where D DE(U )  represents the lifetime utility level of average depositor in decentralized 
equilibrium. In order to have an interior solution, I assume that depositors’ utility constraint (
D D DEU (U )≥ ) is not binding.10 Given t+1θ , optimality condition is given by: 
t+1
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                                                                  (1.24) 
where 
t+1
Sq is the capital good price in social planner’s equilibrium. Comparing equation 
(1.10) and equation (1.24), planner perceives lower marginal benefit from excess lending levels 
of decentralized banks. Figure 1.2 displays banks’ profits from perspective of planner and 
atomistic banks.11 Difference between two viewpoints arises from the asset price perception of 
the planner and atomistic banks as illustrated in Figure 1.3.12 Planner internalizes its contribution 
on asset price distribution while atomistic banks assume that prices are independent of their 
lending. Thus planner chooses lower lending levels than the decentralized banks. The decline in 
                                                           
10
 In Appendix D and in quantitative analysis section, I show that restricted planner solution is still pareto 
better when depositors’ utility constraint is binding and there is corner solution.   
 
11 Figure 1.2 is prepared using benchmark calibration explained in quantitative analysis section. 
 





banks’ lending implies a decline in supply of capital goods which causes higher asset prices in 
planner’s problem (
t+1 t+1
S DEq q≥ ). Therefore, in planner’s problem, even banks’ lending is lower, 
banks’ profits are higher than the decentralized equilibrium and risk neutral shareholders are 
always better off.  
Notice that planner’s solution implies transfer of revenues from depositor to bankers via 
asset prices and capital good supply. Low supply of capital goods decreases the wage income of 
depositors at the steady state where there is no aggregate uncertainty. On the other hand, having 
low leverage and less risky banks decreases the volatility of risk-averse depositors’ incomes. In 
the stochastic environment, low default rates allow banks to accumulate more capital in the long 
run and make them more robust against shocks. This provides safer deposit income for 
depositors by minimizing bankruptcy costs. If the variance of price shocks in the economy is 
high enough, risk-averse depositors’ benefits from having low leverage banks will exceed their 
wage losses. Thus depositors’ utility constraint will not be binding and planner’s solution will be 
an interior solution. 
Proposition 1: There exists a threshold level of variance of shocks, 
2σ% , such that when 
2 2σ σ≥ %  social planner’s solution is always interior solution. Under this interior solution, all 
agents are pareto better and decentralized equilibrium is not constrained efficient. 
Proof: See Appendix D. 
Inefficiency of the decentralized equilibrium is not restricted with variance of the shocks. 




corner solution. Even if the size of shocks is low in the economy, social planner can always 
choose a marginal decrease in lending which makes banks better off and risk-averse depositors 
indifferent (corner solution) due to benefits from lower level of volatility and more robust banks. 
Results of proposition 1 are generalized in proposition 2.  
Proposition 2: Social planner can always choose an allocation which improves welfare of 
all agents for any level of variance of the shocks. Therefore, in general, decentralized 
equilibrium is not constrained inefficient. 
Proof: See Appendix D. 
1.5 Quantitative Analysis 
In this section, I describe the quantitative implications of the model. I present calibration of 
the model, numerical solution of decentralized problem with shocks and sensitivity analysis. 
While solving the model numerically, I use second order approximation with perturbation 
method. Since the model is set up in stochastic environment, second order approximation 
improves the accuracy of the model and estimations (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004). 
1.5.1 Calibration 
The model is parameterized using standard values in the related literature. The risk aversion 
parameter, σ, is set at 2. Quarterly discount factor β is set at 0.96, implying 4 percent annual 
average return on deposits at steady state. In consumption good production, the capital share (α) 




The shareholders’ labor share ensures that shareholders have positive net worth even after 
default to make a fresh start. It also guarantees the positive consumption of shareholders in case 
of default.  
Productivity factor of capital good firm, n, is randomly distributed over the interval [0,2]  
with the uniform density function as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The variance of 
consumption good firm’s technology parameter (θ) is set to 0.36, in keeping with the literature. 
Results with different levels of variance are provided in sensitivity analysis. The ratio of 
shareholders in population doesn’t have significant effect on the results and it is set at η = 0.33. 
As for the bankruptcy cost parameter, there is considerable controversy in the literature. 
Among the similar class of models, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) defined the reasonable interval 
as (0.2, 0.36) by referring to the empirical studies of Altman (1984) and Alderson and Betker 
(1995).  Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) set the parameter to 0.12. All of these studies 
defined the bankruptcy costs for a classical firm rather than a financial institution. The 
bankruptcy cost is underestimated for the banking sector considering the Lehman case in 2008, 
the largest bankruptcy filed with $ 691 billion in assets. According to FDIC report13, current 
bankruptcy plan can recover only 20 cents on every $ 1 of claims and the optimistic completion 
date is 2014, 6 years after the bankruptcy filing. In the benchmark model, I set bankruptcy cost to 
0.36, upper level in the literature. But in sensitivity analysis results with higher bankruptcy costs 
are provided. 
                                                           





The final parameter to be selected is additional discount rate of bankers (δ). This parameter 
allows shareholders to discount future more than depositors and induces the lending in the 
model. The focus of the paper is the leverage of the banks, so contrary to literature discount 
parameter is selected to match the leverage ratio of financial institutions. Leverage ratio used in 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) is 2.5 and 0.5, 
respectively. Considering that average leverage of US banks varies between 20 and 40 over time 
(from 1992 to 2008)14, leverage ratios used in the literature are too low for financial institutions 
and they target classical firms instead. Since the focus of paper is financial institutions, discount 
rate is set to δ=0.3 which implies leverage at 22.  
1.5.2 Response to Asset Price Shock 
The main goal of this section is to analyze the response of financial sector and agents to 
unexpected asset price changes. In order to produce such asset price changes, productivity of 
consumption good firm is used. Consumption good firms are the buyers of capital goods and 
considering asset price formula (equation 1.17), any change in their productivity affects the asset 
prices directly.  
The technology of the consumer good firm is given by;  
t+1 t tlogθ  = ρlogθ +ε                                                                                                           (1.25) 
                                                           





Where ρ is the autocorrelation coefficient and tε  is serially uncorrelated shock.  In the 
benchmark calibration, shocks are assumed to be persistent, ρ=0.9.  
In the simulations, I analyze response of economy to one percent decrease in productivity 
(one percent decrease in asset prices) at the steady state. The results are presented in Figure 1.4 
and Figure 1.5. Figure 1.4 displays the response of financial sector. In the initial period, asset 
price declines one percent. Since current period’s deposit rates, loans, banks’ capital and 
leverage are predetermined with the financial contract in previous period, financial sector’s 
initial response is limited. In the current period, drop in asset prices decreases the profits of the 
banks which cause an increase in default probability and a decline in next period’s starting 
capital. Banks couldn’t respond as they are tied with the financial contract which causes a further 
decline in their profitability.  
In the following periods, loss of capital together with low asset prices creates upward 
pressure on default risks. In order to pull back default probability to steady state levels, banks cut 
their lending significantly, more than one percent. Extreme cut in loans causes a drop in the 
leverage level and decline in the capital good supply. Low supply of capital goods creates an 
asset price recovery and asset price exceeds the steady state levels two periods after the shock. In 
the deposit markets, deposit supply declines with the low wage income of depositors. However 
deposit demand of banks decline further and pulls deposit rates down. Deposit rates recover in 
line with asset prices, as demand from banks is getting better with increasing profitability. In the 




Figure 1.5 displays the response of agents’ consumption to the shock. In the initial period, 
drop in asset prices causes a significant decline in both depositors’ and shareholders’ 
consumption. Initial decrease in shareholders’ consumption is around 5 percent. The reason for 
such a decline is the significant losses in the first period. Since banks’ capital is crucial for future 
profitability and default risks, shareholders prefer to cut more from their consumption and limit 
the decline in banks’ capital. In the following period, banks are able to optimize their leverage in 
financial contract with respect to the shock and they can minimize the losses. Therefore, 
shareholders’ consumption converges back rapidly, but it is still lower than steady state. In the 
long run, shareholders’ consumption converges to steady state levels as shocks are temporary. 
Initial response of depositors to the asset price shock is to cut their consumption. Decreasing 
wage income and deposit revenues amplify the decline in the following period. Decline in 
consumption is higher than one percent but it is more tolerable compared to drop in 
shareholders’ consumption. In the long run, as wages and deposit revenues come back to steady 
state levels, depositors’ consumption converges back to steady state levels too.  
Figure 1.5 displays that negative asset price shock initiates a contraction period in the 
economy. Since banks cut lending in the following period, capital good supply decreases. This 
amplifies the contraction of the output one period after the shock. In the long run, output 
converges to steady state with a slow pace. These results imply the pro-cyclicality of bank’s 




1.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, I examine the sensitivity of results to parameters of the model. I analyze the 
effects of varying each parameter on the results separately by calculating the unconditional 
moments of variables. 
1.5.3.1 Bankruptcy Cost (µ) 
Figure 1.6 displays how the model’s results change with respect to bankruptcy cost. An 
increase in bankruptcy costs means lower revenues for depositors in case of bank’s defaults. 
Therefore, depositors increase interest rates to insure themselves. As banks pay higher interest 
rate for same level of deposits, they cut their leverage. Low lending decreases capital good 
supply and output in the economy. Such a decline capital supply induces a cut in depositor’s 
wage income and consumption. Therefore depositor’s utility decreases with higher bankruptcy 
costs. On the other hand, low capital supply causes higher asset prices. Banks have limited 
commitment and gains from high asset prices overweight deposit rate increases. Hence, utilities 
of banks’ shareholders increase with the bankruptcy costs. 
1.5.3.2 Risk Aversion (σ) 
An increase in risk aversion means higher disutility of depositors from volatility of the 
consumption and thus from variance of shocks. Therefore, depositors increase the share of 
savings in their income while decreasing the share of consumption. In deposit markets, higher 
supply of deposits induces lower interest rates. Thus banks increase the leverage as shown in 




depositors’ consumption. Low asset prices deteriorate banks’ profits but since gains from lower 
borrowing rates overweight losses from asset price declines, shareholders’ utilities increase with 
risk aversion of depositors.  
1.5.3.3 Discount Factor (β) 
Figure 1.8 displays the effects of discount factor on the economy. An increase in discount 
factor implies higher valuation of future consumption by agents. Depositors save more and this 
raises the deposit supply in the markets. High deposit supply and thus low interest rates allow 
banks to increase their leverage. Higher lending stimulates the economy and output increases. 
Although depositors’ saving ratio is higher, depositors’ consumption increases as their wage 
income rises. On the other hand, excess supply of capital goods pulls asset prices down and 
deteriorates the profitability of banks. Moreover, increase in discount factor forces shareholders 
to invest more on bank capital and thus their consumption drops.  
1.5.3.4 Variance and Persistency of Shocks 
An increase in the variance of shocks increases the savings of risk averse depositors. Such 
excess savings cause higher leverage and output as shown in Figure 1.9 and discussed in 
previous sections. In addition, higher variance of shocks increases the default risks and limits 
capital accumulation of the banks. As a result, banks’ profits drop and shareholders’ 
consumption decreases. Higher output implies higher wage income for the depositor. However 
excess volatility in wages and deposit incomes makes risk averse depositors save more by cutting 





An increase in persistency of shocks implies an increase in their variance, since shocks are 
defined as AR(1) process in equation (1.25). Therefore, the response of economy to an increase 
in persistency is similar to response to an increase in variance. 
1.5.4 Social Planner 
In this part of the quantitative analysis section, I evaluate simulation results of the social 
planner’s problems and compare them with the competitive equilibrium. 
1.5.4.1 Planner with Full Capability 
Planner’s problem with full capability, given in equation (1.22), is solved using baseline 
calibration. Table 1.1 displays the unconditional moments of the lifetime utilities of agents. 
Compared with decentralized equilibrium, social planner almost doubles the loan size of an 
average bank and raises the output by 25 percent. It is also capable of increasing depositors’ 
utilities while preserving the shareholder’s utilities. Social planner can succeed such an 
improvement in the economy as it is able to make ex-post transfers to default banks and prevent 
idiosyncratic risk in the economy.   
1.5.4.2 Planner with Restricted Capability 
As discussed in previous sections, planner with full capabilities is not a realistic reference 
point for possible government regulations. Therefore, planner with restricted capability is 
introduced in (1.23). There exist two types of solution to planner’s problem; interior and binding, 




how depositors’ utilities change with variance of shocks in restricted planner’s problem and 
decentralized problem.  
As it is shown in proposition 1, there exist a threshold level of variance where depositor’s 
utility in planner’s problem and decentralized equilibrium is the same. Simulations indicate that 
threshold level of standard deviation of shocks ( σ% ) is equal to 0.59 under baseline calibration. 
When the variance is higher than the threshold level, depositor’s utility in planner’s problem is 
higher than its competitive equilibrium level and thus planner’s solution becomes an interior 
solution. 
Figure 1.11 shows how the utilities of agents change with loan levels when the planner’s 
solution is an interior solution. Restricted planner limits the leverage of banks compared to 
decentralized equilibrium. As the default probability drops, banks are able to accumulate more 
capital in the long run. In the stochastic economy, banks can reach the lending levels of 
competitive equilibrium but with a lower leverage level. Lower leverage level decreases banks’ 
borrowing cost and improves the profitability. Thus shareholder’s utility is higher than the 
competitive equilibrium level. Limiting the bank’s leverage implies a drop in depositor’s utility 
when there is no aggregate shock, at the steady state. But in stochastic environment, risk averse 
depositors like the robust structure of the banks. Low default rate of banks implies low exposure 
of depositors to bankruptcy costs. Therefore depositors ask lower interest rates from the banks. 
This stimulates the lending and thus output in the economy. If the variance of the shocks is large 
enough as in Figure 1.11, depositors’ utilities in planner’s solution will be higher than the 




Proposition 2 shows that constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibrium is independent 
of variance of shocks. Figure 1.12 displays the simulation results when the variance of shocks is 
lower than the threshold level and thus planner’s solution is binding. Planner prefers cutting the 
leverage of banks but decline in leverage is limited by the utility of the depositors. Even with a 
limited decline of steady state lending, shareholders’ profit still improves. The mechanism is 
similar to the interior solution case. But since the uncertainty in the economy is smaller, benefits 
of having more robust banks are lower and it limits further decline in the leverage. However 
planner’s leverage choice is adequate to make banks’ shareholders better off and keep depositor 
indifferent. Thus competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient even with low variance of 
shocks.  
1.6 Conclusion 
This paper has developed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to 
investigate the effects of asset prices on banks’ leverage choices and default risks. Different from 
the existing literature of pecuniary externalities in financial markets, model includes endogenous 
borrowing limits, the existence of bank defaults and related bankruptcy costs. Banks borrow 
from depositor with standard debt contract using their assets as partial collateral. This implicitly 
limits banks’ leverage and allows bank defaults in case of sudden drops in banks’ revenues. 
Banks lend to capital good firms with perfect state contingent contract. Capital good firms sell 




to the banks. The role of consumption good firms is to create demand for capital goods and 
provide wage income to depositors and banks’ shareholders by using their labor force in 
production. In the model, there is one to one match between capital good firms and the banks. 
Therefore heterogeneity of capital good firms implies heterogeneity of banks in loan revenues. 
Sudden drop in the capital good prices pulls down the banks’ revenues and causes defaults 
among the banking sector. In case of default, depositors get all revenues of the banks after 
paying bankruptcy costs. Such bankruptcy costs amplify the inefficiencies due to pecuniary 
externalities. 
The other key feature of the model is to analyze utilities of both depositors and shareholders 
in a closed economy framework that gives a complete picture of welfare analysis. In previous 
studies, depositors or financers of the entrepreneurs are excluded from welfare analysis by open 
economy assumption. Therefore only bankers’ utilities are included in the analysis. 
The key contribution of this paper is to show the existence of pecuniary price externalities 
and provide quantitative analysis of these externalities in an economy with aggregate and 
idiosyncratic uncertainty. I show that decentralized banks do not internalize effects of their 
lending decisions on distribution of asset prices and such pecuniary externalities leads banks to 
take excess risk by over-borrowing. Moreover, using both theoretical framework and quantitative 
analyses, I prove that even an extremely restricted social planner is able to make all agents better 
off by restricting the banks’ leverage and risks in the economy. Our main conclusion is that 




amplification mechanisms such as exogenous borrowing limits, and economy can be potentially 
better off with relevant regulations. 
This paper also provides convenient framework for future studies to compare potential 
benefits of various policy implications to prevent pecuniary externality. One would like to 
examine the welfare results of different tax policies to limit excess leverage in financial markets. 
The model is also suitable to compare the effects of different bailout policies on agents’ welfare. 
Another direction of future extension could be adding credit default swaps (CDS) mechanism 
into the model. Such an extension could wipe out the idiosyncratic shocks and limit the leverage 
if CDS are issued by banks. If they are issued by a third party that doesn’t have adequate 






Figure 1.1: Atomistic Bank’s Profit Expectation in Financial Contract 
 


























































Figure 1.4: The Response of Financial Sector to Aggregate Productivity Shock 
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Figure 1.5: The Response of Economy to Aggregate Productivity Shock (percentage 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                           



























































                                                           
























































Table 1.1: Social Planner with Full Capability vs Decentralized Equilibrium 
 
 
Depositor's   
Utility
Banker's   
Utility
Loan Output
Decentralized -534.8 0.003 0.281 0.333






Chapter 2                                                       
The Welfare Analysis of Asset Price 
Externalities in Banking Industry 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The financial system including commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, etc. is the 
heart of economy. Their role is directing capital to where it is needed and where it is most 
productive in an effort to decrease inefficiency and risk in economy. The financial crisis in 2008, 
exacerbated by the excessive risk-taking and overborrowing of banks and their subsequent 
bailouts was a serious heart attack in both US and global economy. This heart attack was not an 




on the power of decentralized economy and free markets started to remove regulation on US 
economy. Regulations such as Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 are removed gradually starting at the 
end of 90s and they are replaced by self-regulation system which encouraged risk-taking. 
Moreover governments gave implicit and explicit bailout guarantees using various tools such as 
asset purchases and Federal Reserve discounting windows. However financial crisis in 2008 and 
following recession made it clear that self-regulation system in the financial sector doesn’t work 
and banks ignore systemic risks especially in asset markets. Therefore, to prevent possible future 
financial crises, it is essential to re-examine the structure of the banking system and its 
relationships within the whole economy by comparing welfare analysis of different policies.  
This paper presents welfare analysis of dynamic and stochastic economy including the 
banks with the agency costs and defaults at equilibrium. The banks are at the center of the 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and unlike other models in the literature 
they can default with endogenous borrowing limits at equilibrium. We show that generic 
inefficiencies of competitive markets and agency problems in banks’ management lead privately 
optimal decisions of bankers to high risk levels and over-borrowing at social level. We analyze 
society’s welfare under various regulatory policies and find that policies which restrict lending 
ex-ante can restore constrained efficiency. Specifically, our results provide a justification for 
macro prudential approach in regulations. Unlike the existing literature, our paper provides 
quantitative assessments of welfare for both depositors and banks’ shareholders in an economy 




The two key sources of inefficiency in our model are the agency problem and pecuniary 
price externalities. Agency problem exists since shareholders and banks’ managements are 
different in the model. Shareholders provide capital to the banks and optimize their utilities in the 
long run. On the other hand banks’ managements give lending and borrowing decisions and their 
goal is to optimize banks’ profits in short run. Therefore bank’s management undervalues the 
possible risks and damages from defaults. One of the contributions of our paper is to compare all 
welfare analysis and planner’s solution from the second best perspective by keeping agency 
problem in the model. Second source of inefficiency is the pecuniary price externalities due to 
generic inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium. Private atomistic bankers do not internalize 
the effect of their lending decisions on asset prices and impose pecuniary externality on each 
other.  
Our paper develops an infinite period model with incomplete financial markets. The key 
features of the model are endogenous borrowing limit, existence of default and related 
bankruptcy costs.  Banks can borrow from depositors with standard debt contract using their 
initial capital as partial collateral. Unlike the existing literature of pecuniary externalities, instead 
of financial frictions and exogenous borrowing limits, we use partial collateralization mechanism 
which imposes endogenous borrowing limits and allows default of banks in the equilibrium.  
In the model, banks are exposed to idiosyncratic risk from capital good firm’s technology 
and systemic risk from the capital good prices. Banks are fully rational and correctly perceive the 
risk associated with their lending decisions. Nevertheless atomistic banks do not internalize their 




atomistic banks to use the right asset price distribution in their ex-ante decisions, and induces 
them to take excessive systemic risk.  
In this paper, we examine variety of regulations and bailout policies. These measures are 
imposed before a crisis hit so that we can assess the efficiency of policies against uncertainties in 
the economy. We find that policies that restrict lending in decentralized economy improve 
welfare of both depositors and banks’ shareholders. Moreover social planner solution can’t be 
restored by constant capital requirement as proposed in Basel requirements. We show that 
governments can reach constrained efficiency by implying reserve requirements. If the aggregate 
uncertainty is below the certain level, prudential reserve requirements will serve better than 
constant reserve requirements which justifies macro prudential policies in emerging countries 
such as Brazil and China. We study different bailout policies such as financed by tax on wages 
and tax on banks. We find that preannounced bailout policies exaggerate the risk appetite of 
banks and damage welfare of the economy. 
Our model builds on the literature of macroeconomics models with financial frictions 
described by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Carlstrom 
and Fuerst (1997). These papers and following work in the literature introduced agency costs 
into dynamic macroeconomic models to amplify the macroeconomic shocks. This paper is 
focused on asset pricing and banking sector balance sheet relations by eliminating the monetary 
authority and all other nominal frictions (price frictions). Different than the literature, first in this 
paper, effects of bankruptcy costs in a stochastic economy are considered by using second order 




Our paper is also related to the literature on generic inefficiency of competitive equilibrium 
under incomplete markets. (Hart, 1975; Stiglitz, 1982; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis,1986). 
The more recent contributions in this literature (Lorenzoni, 2008; Korinek, 2011; Jeanne and 
Korinek, 2011; Bianchi, 2010) analyzed the role of pecuniary externalities in the inefficiencies of 
decentralized equilibrium under financial frictions. Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2011) used 
finite period model in which entrepreneurs borrow to finance their projects in the first period and 
face the risk of binding financial constraints in the following period. Entrepreneurs’ defaults are 
excluded by allowing the fire sales of productive assets. In financially binding states fire sales 
cause pecuniary externality in asset prices, which is ex-ante undervalued by atomistic 
entrepreneurs. Pecuniary externalities exist only in fire sales of productive assets because 
entrepreneurs are not allowed to sell their production in the markets. In this paper, by contrast, 
all production goods can be sold in the markets, and furthermore, banks will default if they can’t 
pay their debt. Thus, we are able to analyze the effects of pecuniary externalities in all states, and 
moreover, we show that generic inefficiencies of decentralized equilibrium still exist without 
amplification effects of fire sales in binding states.  
Bianchi (2010) and Jeanne and Korinek (2011) analyzed similar pecuniary externalities 
using open economy DSGE models. In these papers, insiders borrow from outsiders and their 
default is excluded by full collateralization. Borrowing limits depend on asset prices with 
exogenous parameters. Borrowing limits are binding only in bad states and they amplify the 
effects of crisis by depressing the asset prices more. Atomistic agents overborrow by ignoring 




default is not allowed and pecuniary externality exists only in financially constrained states. 
Furthermore, outsiders’ utilities are excluded by open economy assumption in welfare analysis. 
In this paper, by contrast, there is partial collateralization in a closed economy and borrowing 
limits are endogenously determined in the market. Thus, I can analyze bank defaults and 
consider the welfare of all agents in the model. Moreover, in this study, pecuniary externalities 
exist in all states of the economy.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the benchmark model. 
Section 3 characterizes the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the social planner’s 
problem. Section 5 presents the quantitative analysis. Section 6 compares the social welfare 
under different policy measures and presents sensitivity analysis and section 7 concludes. 
2.2 The Model 
The model is a closed economy DSGE model and it consists of continuum of agents with 
unit mass. Basic structure of the model as follows: There are two types of atomistic agents; 
depositors (fraction 1-η) and banks’ shareholders (fraction η). Depositors are the identical 
households living forever. They work, save and consume. Shareholders are the owners of the 
banks and each shareholder has shares in a specific bank. Shareholders have two sources of 




banks as capital. Both shareholders and banks are heterogeneous in terms of their initial capital.1. 
Banks’ managements are different than shareholders. They have short term, one period, contract 
and their objective, given the initial capital, is to maximize banks’ profits at the end of each 
period. At the end of each period, banks borrow from depositors to invest in next period’s capital 
good production. While borrowing, banks’ managements solve the financial contract problem.  
Since financial contract is just one period in length, it is explained separately from general 
equilibrium model.  
Banks have two sources for their lending; their deposits (dt) and capital (wt). Atomistic 
depositors are the only suppliers of deposits. Depending on the average expected return (at) from 
each unit of deposit, depositor saves std  unit of consumption good and distributes his savings 
among the banks. Law of large numbers allows them to insure against idiosyncratic risk of the 
banks’ lending activities. But depositors are still exposed to the banks’ default risk due to 
systemic risk. Banks pay interest rate rd when they do not default. When bank defaults, 
depositors get all the remaining capital of the bank and pay the bankruptcy cost, defined as 
monitoring and liquidation costs. In the deposit markets, dtr and at clear the market and equalize 
total saving of depositors to total deposit demand from the banks, st t(1-η)d =ηd .
2 
                                                           
1Keeping track of variables’ mean instead of their distribution is adequate due to the assumption of atomistic 
agents and law of large numbers. 
 
2 Deposit demand is different among the heterogeneous banks. But assumption of law of large numbers allows 





Banks’ revenues depend on the performance of their investment in capital good firms. 
Capital good firms’ initial endowment is zero. In order to produce, they need to borrow lt units of 
loan. There is one to one match between banks and firms. Each firm borrows only from a 
specific bank. Their technology is linear, ntlt. nt is the productivity factor and randomly 
distributed over the interval L H[n ,n ]  with the density function f(nt),assumed uniform. Both banks 
and capital good firms don’t know productivity level before production. The banks have perfect 
monitoring skills over firms. The contract between firms and the banks is assumed perfectly state 
contingent debt contract similar to issuing equity for debt. Capital good firms sell capital goods 
to consumption good firms at price qt and transfer all their returns to the banks.  
If bank’s revenues are not enough to pay its liabilities to depositors (qtntlt < r
ddt), it will 
default. Productivity parameter of capital good firms is crucial to determine default risk. There 
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Banks’ default probability is the cumulative distribution function of n at the threshold level, 
tF(n )% . Under the financial contract with given qt+1, banks’ expected profit (in terms of 
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where Bt+1π  is the bank’s return from each unit of lending in terms of capital good. Similarly 
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where µ is the bankruptcy cost parameter and Dt+1π  is the depositors’ return from each unit of 
lending in terms of capital good. At the end of each period, banks optimize next period’s 
expected profits subject to depositors’ participation constraint. . The optimal contract is the 
solution of the bank’s optimization problem given by: 
t+1
B D
t t+1 t+1 t+1 t t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1
l
max  E q l π ,  subject to E q l π a d≥                                                                      (2.4) 
Depositors are identical and their participation constraint is always binding. It is assumed 
that returns are attractive enough to convince banks to borrow. Therefore, banks’ participation 
constraint is always satisfied and can be ignored while solving the optimization problem. It is 
important to mention that shareholders own the banks but it is the bank’s management who is in 
charge and solves the contract problem. Since managements’ employment contract is short term, 
their goal is to maximize the next period profits and they ignore further future profits (agency 
problem).  This induces risk taking behavior of banks as future losses in case of possible defaults 
are ignored in the financial contract. 
In the general equilibrium model, infinitely-lived, identical, atomistic depositors’ preference 
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In this expression, β is the discount factor and utility of depositor has the constant-relative-
risk-aversion (CRRA) form. Each period, depositors allocate their incomes between saving and 
consumption according to budget constraint given by:  
s D d D
t 1 t t t t t td +c w h +q l π η/(1-η)+ ≤                                                                                                               (2.6) 
where Dtc  is the consumption, ht is the labor supply and w
d
t is the real wage. Labor supply is 
assumed constant to focus on financial relations. The second term at the right side of the budget 
equation is the return from savings. Since depositors are identical it is calculated by averaging 
the total payments from the banks.  
Banks’ shareholders have two sources of income; banks’ profits and wage income. At the 
end of each period, they decide how much of the income to consume and reinvest in banks. Their 
reinvestments are used as initial capital for banks’ next period operations. In order to induce 
shareholders’ consumption and thus banks’ borrowing in the model, we assumed that 
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where Btc denotes shareholder’s time t consumption and γ  (0,1)∈  denotes the additional 
discount rate. Shareholders supply constant labor each period and this allows them to enter the 
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where t+1w is the next period bank’s capital and 
B
tw  is the shareholder’s wage. 
Consumption goods producers buy capital from capital goods firm and hire labor from 
depositors and shareholders. Capital is fully depreciated at the end of each period. Their 
production technology is given by: 
H H1-α-α αα
t t t tY =θ (K ) (H ) (η)                                                                                                                         (2.9) 
where θt denotes the stochastic productivity parameter, Kt denotes the aggregate supply of 
capital goods, Ht denotes the aggregate supply of depositors’ labor and η denotes the aggregate 
supply of shareholders’ labor.  
2.3 Equilibrium 
2.3.1 Optimality Conditions 
In the financial contract (2.4), bank’s problem at time t is to choose lt+1 to maximize its 
expected profit subject to depositor’s participation constraint. The optimality conditions require3: 
2 L 2 B
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                                                                                      (2.10) 
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where n  is the expected return. Optimality condition (2.10) equates marginal profit of bank 
from an extra unit of lending to the marginal cost of borrowing. As the threshold level of n 
depends on interest rate and leverage ratio in equation (2.1), optimality conditions (2.10 and 
2.11) imply that all banks choose same leverage ratio in the financial contract.4 It allows great 
simplification in the solution of the general equilibrium model while preserving the 
heterogeneity among the banks.  
In the general equilibrium model, depositors choose the stochastic processes { }D st t+1 t 0c ,d ≥  to 
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t 1 t t t t t td +c =w h +q l π η/(1-η)+                                                                                            (2.13) 
The optimality condition (2.12) is the euler equation. Expression in the brackets is the 
depositor’s next period’s return from extra unit of saving.  
Shareholders choose the stochastic processes { }Bt t+1 t 0c , w ≥ to maximize their utility (2.7) 
subject to the budget constraint (2.8). The optimality conditions are given by:  
                                                           
4 Detailed proof is given in Appendix A.1. 
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Equation (2.14) is the euler equation for the shareholders. Expression at the right side of 
equation is the bank’s return from extra unit of capital.  
There are four markets; deposit, labor, capital goods and consumption goods. Competition 
in the factor markets implies that wages and capital good prices are equal to their marginal 
products: 
d Bt t
t H t H
t t
Y Y
w (1-α-α )    and   w =α
H η
=                                                                                            (2.16) 
H H1-α-α αα-1
t t t tq =αθ (K ) (H ) (η)                                                                                                                  (2.17) 
Technology parameter of the consumption good firms, θt, is the source of systemic risk in 
the economy via capital good prices. Labor, deposit, capital goods and consumption goods 
market clearing conditions are given by6: 
t tH =(1-η)h                                                                                                                        (2.18) 
t tK =ηnl                                                                                                                             (2.19) 
s
t t(1-η)d =ηd                                                                                                                       (2.20) 
D B
t t t t t t t+1Y =(1-η)c ηc +ηF(n )µq l ηl+ +%                                                                                (2.21) 
                                                           






2.3.2 Equilibrium Definition 
There are five state variables in the decentralized optimization problem. At period t, banks 
and depositors decide on next period’s lending (lt+1) and starting capital (wt+1). In deposit 
markets, depositor’s average expected future return (at+1) is determined to clear the deposit 
market. Similarly deposit interest rate ( dt+1r ) is determined to insure the depositors. The other 
state variable is the technology of consumption good firms. Rational agents perceive actual 
levels of aggregate lending and capital. They estimate asset price using equation (2.17). 
A decentralized competitive equilibrium for this economy is defined by interest rate dt+1r , 








tc , wt+1, lt+1, dt+1, 
Kt+1, tn%  where they are the functions of (
d
tr , at, lt,, wt, θt) and satisfy the following: 
(i) Financial contract optimality conditions (equation 2.10 and 2.11).  
(ii) Depositors’ optimality conditions (equation 2.12 and 2.13). 
(iii) Bankers’ optimality conditions (equation 2.14 and 2.15). 
(v) Market clearing conditions (equation 2.16 to 2.21). 





2.4 Social Planner’s Problem 
In the decentralized equilibrium, atomistic agents take aggregate variables as given, 
particularly total lending (Lt+1). While solving the financial contract, individual banks don’t 
internalize their contribution to total lending (dLt+1/dlt+1=0) which implies that banks ignore the 
effects of their actions on the capital good’s price distribution (dqt+1/dlt+1=0). Thus atomistic 
banks overvalue the marginal gains from lending in their optimality condition (2.10). This 
induces atomistic banks to take excess risk by lending more, and hence high default rates are 
observed at the decentralized equilibrium.   
2.4.1 Planner with Restricted Capability 
Excess capability of planner is not a suitable reference point for possible government 
regulations. Therefore, in the remainder of the paper, we assume planner’s abilities are limited 
and we analyze solution from second best perspective. We suppose that planner has control only 
over the banking sector and it can’t make ex-post transfers to the banks and depositors7. We 
assume that planner has regulatory tools to control the banks’ lending in the financial contract. 
Thus planner can interfere only in financial contracts on behalf of the banking sector. 
The social planner solves the financial contract problem (2.4) by internalizing effects of 
lending decisions on asset prices. The optimization problem is formulated as: 
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where D DE(U )  represents the lifetime utility level of average depositor in decentralized 
equilibrium. In order to have an interior solution, we assume that depositors’ utility constraint (
D D DEU (U )≥ ) is not binding.8  Given t+1θ , optimality condition is given by: 
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                                                                      (2.23) 
where 
t+1
Sq is the capital good price in social planner’s equilibrium. Comparing equation 
(2.10) and equation (2.23), planner perceives lower marginal benefit from excess lending levels 
of decentralized banks. Planner internalizes its contribution on asset price distribution while 
atomistic banks assume that prices are independent of their lending. Thus planner chooses lower 
lending than the decentralized banks. The decline in banks’ lending implies a decline in supply 
of capital goods which causes higher asset prices in planner’s problem (
t+1 t+1
S DEq q≥ ). Therefore, in 
planner’s problem, even banks’ lending is lower, banks’ profits are higher than the decentralized 
equilibrium and risk neutral shareholders are always better off.  
                                                           
8
 In Appendix D and in quantitative analysis section, I show that restricted planner solution is still pareto better 





2.5 Quantitative Analysis 
In this section, we describe the quantitative implications of the model. While solving the 
model numerically, we use second order approximation with perturbation method. Since the 
model is set up in stochastic environment, second order approximation improves the accuracy of 
the model and estimations (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004). 
The model is parameterized using standard values in the related literature. The risk aversion 
parameter, σ, is set at 2. Quarterly discount factor β is set at 0.96, implying 4 percent annual 
average return on deposits at steady state. In consumption good production, the capital share (α) 
is set at 0.35. Labor share of depositors and shareholders are set at 0.64 and 0.01 respectively. 
The shareholders’ labor share ensures that shareholders have positive net worth even after 
default to make a fresh start. It also guarantees the positive consumption of shareholders in case 
of default.  
Productivity factor of capital good firm, n, is randomly distributed over the interval [0,2]  
with the uniform density function as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). The variance of 
consumption good firm’s technology parameter (θ) is set to 0.36, in keeping with the literature. 
Results with different levels of variance are provided in sensitivity analysis. The ratio of 
shareholders in population doesn’t have significant effect on the results and it is set at η = 0.33. 
As for the bankruptcy cost parameter, there is considerable controversy in the literature. 
Among the similar class of models, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) defined the reasonable interval 




(1995). Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) set the parameter to 0.12. All of these studies 
defined the bankruptcy costs for a classical firm rather than a financial institution. The 
bankruptcy cost is underestimated for the banking sector considering the Lehman case in 2008, 
the largest bankruptcy filed with $ 691 billion in assets. According to FDIC report9, current 
bankruptcy plan can recover only 20 cents on every $ 1 of claims and the optimistic completion 
date is 2014, 6 years after the bankruptcy filing. In the benchmark model, I set bankruptcy cost to 
0.36, upper level in the literature. But in sensitivity analysis results with higher bankruptcy costs 
are provided. 
The final parameter to be selected is additional discount rate of bankers (δ). This parameter 
allows shareholders to discount future more than depositors and induces the lending in the 
model. The focus of the paper is the leverage of the banks, so contrary to literature discount 
parameter is selected to match the leverage ratio of financial institutions. Leverage ratio used in 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) is 2.5 and 0.5, 
respectively. Considering that average leverage of US banks varies between 20 and 40 over time 
(from 1992 to 2008)10, leverage ratios used in the literature are too low for financial institutions 
and they target classical firms instead. Since the focus of paper is financial institutions, discount 
rate is set to δ=0.3 which implies leverage at 22.  
                                                           
9 ‘The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd-Frank Act’, FDIC Quarterly 
(2011). 
 





2.5.1 Planner with Restricted Capability 
Simulation results in Figure 2.1 displays how agents’ utilities change with variance of 
shocks in restricted planner’s problem and decentralized problem. When the volatility in the 
economy is high enough, both depositors and banks’ shareholders are pareto better in planner’s 
problem. If the standard deviation of shocks is lower than the threshold level, 0.6, restricted 
planner can still make shareholders better off and keep depositors indifferent.   
In stochastic environment, private banks couldn’t estimate the costs of systemic shocks and 
take excess risk. But restricted planner internalizes these risks and limits the leverage of banks 
compared to decentralized equilibrium. As the default probability drops, banks are able to 
accumulate more capital in the long run. In the stochastic economy, banks can reach the lending 
levels of competitive equilibrium but with a lower leverage level. Low default rate of banks 
implies low exposure of depositor to bankruptcy cost. Therefore depositor asks lower rates from 
the banks and this stimulates the lending and thus output in the economy.  
2.6 Welfare Analysis 
In the previous chapter, we prove that decentralized equilibrium is not socially efficient and 
even a restricted planner can improve the welfare of all agents in the economy. Moreover we 
show that planner can succeed such a solution with lower leverage and default levels. In this 
chapter, we expand our analysis from restricted social planner to possible policy measures which 




2.6.1 Constant Reserve Requirement 
Reserve requirement policies are especially popular in emerging countries to control the 
lending in banking system. In this section, we apply constant and prudential reserve requirements 
to the decentralized economy and compute the welfare gains.  
Reserve requirement can be formulated like tax on deposits. In our model, we set it as tax on 
lending for simplification of calculations. Since initial capital is given, putting a tax on loans is 
similar to putting a tax on the deposits at the margin. In addition, we assume that after collecting 
reserve requirements, government uses them to subsidy banks with lump sum rebates. Such a 
policy limits the risk appetite of the banks as the cost of extra lending increases at the margin. 
Both depositors and banks benefit from such a policy. It provides less volatile deposit income for 
depositors as banks become more robust to systemic price shocks. Banks are better off too as 
higher asset prices increases their returns from investments. Moreover, low default rates decrease 
their funding costs. 
The loan level under constant reserve requirement from banks’ perspective is rewritten as; 
'
t+1 t+1 t+1l =(1-τ)l +T                                                                                                                                      (2.24) 
where t+1T  is the lump-sum rebate, τ is the constant reserve requirement and t+1 t+1T = τl . 
Private banks perceive cost of the loans higher due to reserve requirement. Banks’ profit function 
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Solving financial contract in equation (2.4) using the new profit function with reserve 
requirement gives the first order condition as; 
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                                                                (2.26) 
If first order condition (2.26) is compared with social planner’s first order condition in 
equation (2.23), constant reserve requirement can achieve restricted planner’s solution and thus 
welfare levels when τ = 1-α . Notice that this reserve requirement level is optimal when the 
standard deviation of systemic shocks is above threshold level, 0.6 and hence solution is interior. 
As shown in planner’s problem, when standard deviation is lower than the threshold level, 
problem has binding constraint. In this case, in order to find a solution, we apply a heuristic 
approach. First, using the simulations, we find the utility of shareholders and depositors for 
various levels of constant reserve requirement levels as displayed in Figure 2.2. Then we 
determine set of pareto better reserve requirement levels given as shaded region in Figure 2.2. 
Finally, within this pareto better range of reserve requirements, we keep depositors utility same 
as in decentralized economy and try to maximize shareholders’ utility. Therefore we implicitly 
transfer all surpluses to shareholders. According to Figure 2.2, if we apply this approach, optimal 





2.6.2 Prudential Reserve Requirement 
The other reserve requirement policy commonly preferred by many countries is macro 
prudential approach. In this policy, reserve requirement level is not constant; instead it is linear 
function of the state of economy. If the economy is heating, government will increase the reserve 
requirement to cool the economy and prevent excess lending of financial sector. If the economy 
is below its potential, government will cut reserve requirements to stimulate the lending. The 
mechanism is similar to constant reserve requirement policy; both depositors and banks benefit 
from more stable economy with lower default rates and higher asset prices. Moreover prudential 
policy will provide flexibility to the economy in stochastic environment against the persistency 
of shocks. Therefore both depositor and bankers welfare is better off.  
In order to simulate the policy in our model, we formulate the reserve requirement as a 
linear function of technology parameter which is the source of systemic shocks, t+1 c t+1τ =τ +τEθ . 
cτ  is the constant parameter, τ  is the linear dependence to the state of economy and both 
parameters are nonnegative. We also try various functional forms and our simulation results 
show that linear function is the optimal form of macro prudential policy.  
In this functional form, if the expected technology parameter is below its steady state level 
and so the prices, optimal reserve requirement level drops. In the opposite case, the reserve 
requirement level increases and prevent banks from taking excess risk. Rest of the solution is 
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The parameters of optimal reserve requirement depend on the volatility of the shock in 
economy. When the volatility of systemic shock in the economy is above the threshold level, 
optimal parameters are cτ = 1-α and τ 0=  which is same as constant reserve requirement. If the 
volatility is below the threshold, both parameters are positive depending on the volatility level. 
Figure 2.3 displays the welfare comparison of constant reserve requirement, prudential reserve 
requirement and decentralized economy under different volatility of shocks. In Figure 2.3, it is 
obvious that prudential reserve requirement is pareto better than constant reserve requirement 
policy and decentralized economy. These results are justification of reserve requirement 
regulations. Moreover, it implies that difference between prudential approach and constant 
reserve requirement is significant when standard deviation of shocks is below the threshold, 0.6. 
In order to give an idea, most studies in the literature choose standard deviation of shocks 
between 0.13-0.3 in the empirical analysis, which implies the superiority of prudential approach 
according to our results. 
2.6.3 Bailout financed by Wage Tax 
During the crisis period, it is a common policy for governments to bail out the financial 
institutions using tax payers’ money. In this section, we examine the long run welfare effects of 




We revise our benchmark model by allowing the government to bail out x percent of the 
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Right side of the equation (2.28) is the government expenditure for bailouts. Equation (2.28) 
gives the required tax level, Tt at each period.  
Bailout policy limits monitoring power of depositors over the banks. Since in case of 
defaults government pays the deposits, depositors don’t put an extra risk spread on the deposit 
rates. Banks internalize such effects of bailout policy in their objective functions. Revised form 
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Bank’s first order condition becomes; 
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Notice that when there is no government bailout, x=0, equation (2.29) is same as the first 
order condition of decentralized economy given in equation (2.10). Figure 2.4 displays the 
comparison of welfare with decentralized economy. Banks are worse off in all states of the 
economy. Due to government guarantee and low cost of funding, banks takes excess risks and 
increase lending up to inefficient levels. High lending lowers the asset prices and bank profits 




economy. Depositors pay high taxes to finance the bailout costs. Therefore, a pure bailout policy 
financed by wage tax which is applied to preserve economic stability makes the welfare of all 
agents worse off in the long run.  
2.6.4 Bailout Financed by Bank Tax 
The main criticism about the bailout polices is to spend tax payers’ money to pay costs of 
the banks’ gambling. Especially ethical discussions stress that the bailout cost should be paid 
again by the banking system. But could the welfare of the economy improve if healthy banks pay 
the bailout costs? In this section, we answer this question by analyzing the welfare impacts of a 
bailout policy financed by the taxes on the healthy banks. 
We revise our benchmark model by imposing government balanced budget condition at 
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where Tt is the tax on the profit of healthy banks. Right side of the equation is the bailout 
cost for x percent of the default banks.  
Banks know the tax rate function but they don’t internalize the effect of their leverage 
decision on the bailout tax. Similar to asset price discussion in the benchmark model, they think 
they are too small to affect the tax rate. The lack of such internalization kills the efficiency of the 
policy. Banks still ignore the cost of their decisions at the margin in their objective function. 
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The relevant first order condition becomes; 
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Notice that equation (2.31) is same as equation (2.10) when bailout rate, x is zero. Figure 2.4 
shows the welfare of the agents in the economy. Utilities of banks’ shareholders are worse than 
their levels in decentralized equilibrium and utilities of depositors are just slightly better. The 
mechanism is similar to bailout policy with wage tax described in previous section. Banks don’t 
internalize effects of their lending decisions on tax rates. They take excess risk as they think 
government pays bailout with a general profit tax. But since the general profit tax increases due 
to atomistic banks’ excess risk taking, banks pay high taxes and banks’ shareholders’ utility is 
even lower than wage tax version. On the depositors’ side, since their deposit income is 
guaranteed and bailout costs paid by healthy banks in the system, depositors will be slightly 
better off.  
2.6.5 Combination of Policies: Prudential Reserve Requirement and Bailout 
In this section, we analyze application of prudential reserve requirement and bailout policies 
at the same time. Bailout policy financed by profit tax on banks seems a plausible policy choice 
in terms of ethical norms. Banking system pays the cost of risky decisions and inefficiencies due 




effect of their decision on the tax rates and it induces excess risk taking. In order to limit banks’ 
excess risk taking, we also apply prudential reserve requirement policy at the same time.  
We revise our benchmark model using similar approach in reserve requirement and bailout 
sections. The tax equation is same as equation (2.30) in bailout section. After resolving the 
bank’s problem by adding reserve requirement and bailouts, the new first order equation 
becomes; 
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Notice that when taxes and reserve requirements are zero in equation (2.32), it becomes 
same as decentralized economy’s first order condition.  
Figure 2.5 displays the results of the simulations for various volatilities of the systemic 
shock.  In order to compare the policies, we choose reserve requirements in binding states such 
that all surpluses are transferred to banks. Considering shareholders’ utility graph in Figure 2.5, 
it is obvious that combination of reserve requirement and bailout policies is better off than all 
other policies. In the previous section, we show that single bailout policy is even worse than 
decentralized economy. But when it is combined with prudential reserve requirement policy, we 
can prevent bankruptcy cost without inducing excess risk taking among the banks. Thus all 
agents’ welfare improves. In addition, notice that as variance of shocks in the economy gets 
bigger, utility gains of risk averse depositors due to stability become more dominant than 




variance of shocks is high, welfare of the banks’ shareholders converges to its levels in pure 
prudential policy.   
2.6.6 Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
In this section, we examine the effectiveness of credit default swaps against the shocks in 
the financial system. Credit default swap (CDS) is the one of the most popular insurance 
derivatives where the seller of CDS compensates the buyer in the event of loan default. We 
define the CDS such that buyer banks are compensated when the returns from their loans are 
below a threshold level. We analyze two different designs of insurance system.  
2.6.6.1 CDS issued under Government Protection 
In this part, we design the derivatives such that sellers of CDS compensate the buyer banks 
when their loan returns are below the default threshold level. Compensation amount is the 
difference between realized return and threshold level. We assume that these CDSs are sold by 
only insurance agents. In addition, these insurance agents are bailed out by government when 
necessary. Therefore, banks have implicit bailout guarantee from the government and this is 
similar to bailout policies considered in previous sections.  
When the CDS are introduced to the benchmark model, objective functions of the banks in 
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where Ct+1 is the fix cost of CDS. Banks benefit from CDS insurance since depositors don’t 
ask additional risk spread in deposit interest rates. Banks’ funding cost is lower than 
decentralized economy and it is independent of their leverage decisions. Since there is 
informational asymmetry, insurance agents can’t observe the exact level of risk that banks are 
taking. In addition, government insurance kills any monitoring incentive of insurance agents. 
Insurance agents’ only goal is to sell as much CDSs as possible.  In such a design, banks want to 
lend as much as possible as they don’t bear the downside risks.  The implications of such a 
system is similar to pure bailout policies mentioned in previous sections. Welfare in economy 
deteriorates due to inefficiently high lending.  
2.6.6.2 CDS issued by Private Banks 
In the previous set up, banks don’t bear the cost of excess risk. Therefore, in this section, we 
change the design of the insurance system such that both buyers and sellers of CDSs are the 
banks and there is no insurance agency or government protection. Banks insure themselves by 
exchanging CDS with every other bank. When a bank defaults, it is compensated up to the 
average level of loan returns in system. It is similar to creating pool for revenues of the banks 
and distributing these revenues to the banks evenly. Therefore idiosyncratic uncertainty 
disappears and each bank guarantees average level of return, n .  
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where -i t+1C (L )  is the revenue from CDS sold to all other banks given the aggregate lending 
Lt+1. i t+1c (l )  is the cost of buying CDS from other banks when the bank’s own lending is at lt+1. θ 
is the systemic shock in the economy. Since CDS is the price of the default risk, its cost is equal 
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Notice that, when banks exchange CDS, they implicitly pay all their liabilities even in the 
default. Therefore, limited liability situation is not valid anymore. This is the cost of getting rid 
of idiosyncratic uncertainty in their returns. Banks’ possible losses in case of defaults are 
reflected in the price of CDSs they have bought. Thus, they implicitly internalize all their 
liabilities in their objective function. Therefore, their lending becomes lower compared to 
decentralized equilibrium. Such am insurance mechanism improves the welfare similar to reserve 
requirement policies. 
CDSs improve the welfare under the assumption that systemic shocks are not big enough. 
However such an improvement comes with tail risk for the whole economy. If the systemic 
shock is big enough, asset prices can drop to a level where banks’ total revenues can’t pay their 




default in the economy. But if banks don’t exchange CDS, even if the systemic shock is big, the 
healthy banks with higher asset returns will not default. Therefore, benefits of CDSs are limited 
to the size of the shocks. Crises might be contagious due to CDS linkage and the financial system 
might be under risk. Contagious effect of CDSs is in line with the result of Stiglitz (2010) paper 
where he proves that a full financial integration might not be desirable due to contagious effects. 
Stiglitz (2010) paper shows that when the crisis in one country is big enough, it can be 
contagious to other countries of the union which are obliged to send aid. In this section, we show 
that CDSs create a similar linkage between banks and when the shocks are big enough, banks are 
forced to default because of these CDS exposure even if they are healthy.  
2.6.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
In previous sections, we present our policy analysis under various levels of variance of 
systemic shock which is one of the key parameters in the model. In this section, we examine the 
sensitivity of our results to other parameters of the model. Table 2.1 to Table 2.4 show how the 
welfare of agents and leverage in the economy vary with parameters under different policy 
alternatives. Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 present the sensitivity results when the systemic price 
volatility is low. Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 present the sensitivity results when volatility is high.  
In general, sensitivity analysis shows that our results and policy comparisons in previous 
sections are robust to the choice of parameters. Prudential reserve requirement has superiority 
over other regulations. Moreover, under reserve requirement, banks have lower leverage 




Output elasticity of capital (α): A decrease in capital share of consumption good production 
implies a decrease in asset prices and increase in depositors’ wages. Therefore, depositors’ 
welfare increases in all policy alternatives and in decentralized model. Lower asset prices reduce 
banks profitability, and thus, banks’ leverage declines in all policies except bailout with bank tax 
scenario.  
Output elasticity of shareholders’ labor (α
H
): An increase in the elasticity of labor for 
shareholders implies an increase in their wages and decrease in depositors’ wages. It is similar to 
a transfer from depositors to banks’ shareholders. Therefore, shareholders’ welfare increases, 
while depositors’ welfare drops compared to baseline parameterization in all policy alternatives. 
Discount Factor (β):  A decrease in the discount factor leads to increase in risk free interest 
rates. Banks should offer higher deposit rates to convince depositors to save. As a result, higher 
deposit earnings improve depositors’ welfare. On the other hand, higher funding cost lowers 
banks’ profits. Moreover, shareholders prefer consumption instead of reinvesting and supplying 
capital to the banks. Thus both banks’ initial capital and loans decline in the economy, but 
leverage doesn’t change significantly. 
Persistence of Productivity (ρ): A decrease in persistence of shocks leads to decline in 
predictable component of the next period prices. Therefore, risk averse depositors cut their 
funding to banks and leverage drops. Risk averse depositors benefit from robust banking system 
due to less volatility in their deposit income. 
Risk Aversion of Depositors (σ): An increase in risk aversion implies a higher precautionary 




and raise the leverage. If depositors are assumed risk neutral, depositors will cut their savings 
and banks will struggle to finance their lending. In such a case, leverage in the economy and 
banks’ profits drop. 
Bankruptcy Cost (µ): Bankruptcy cost is an important determinant of the risk spread on 
deposit interest rates. A decline in bankruptcy costs leads to a decrease in deposit interest rates. 
Thus banks’ risk appetite increases and they raise leverage. However higher leverage depresses 
the asset prices next period and weakens banks’ profits. On the other hand, depositors get rid of 
paying high monitoring costs and their welfare increases. 
Shareholders’ Discount Factor (γ): Shareholders’ discount factor is important for allocation 
of their income between consumption and reinvestment on the bank.  A decrease in the discount 
factor leads to a decrease in reinvestment on the banks as shareholders perceive future less 
valuable. Decreasing capital supply raises banks leverage and default risks. Therefore, depositors 
ask higher spreads and banks’ profits decline. Since banks become more sensitive to systemic 
shocks, volatility of deposit income increases and depositors’ welfare decreases.  
Banks Loan Returns (n
H
):  A decline in the upper level of loan returns deteriorates bank’s 
profitability. Their balance sheet weakens and default risk increases. As banks become more 
sensitive to the shocks, volatility in their deposit payments increases and depositors’ welfare 
declines.   
Agents’ Population (η): A decrease in shareholders’ ratio of population implies higher 




Banks benefit from cheap funding and their profits increase. On the other hand, depositors saving 
income and welfare decline.  
2.7 Conclusion  
This paper investigates the effects of asset price externalities on welfare of the banks and 
depositors in a model with the bank defaults and bankruptcy costs at equilibrium. Decentralized 
banks do not internalize effects of their lending decisions on distribution of asset prices and such 
pecuniary externalities leads banks to take excess risk by over-borrowing. High leverage induces 
excess supply of assets and depresses the asset prices in future periods. This makes the banks 
vulnerable to systemic shocks and prevents their capital accumulation. In addition, increasing 
volatility in deposit repayments and bankruptcy costs deteriorate depositors’ utilities. We show 
that even a restricted social planner can increase robustness of banks against systemic shocks, 
and improve the social welfare by reducing the leverage ex-ante.  
The key contribution of this paper is the analysis of such pecuniary externality under variety 
of regulations and bailout policies. We show that generic inefficiencies of competitive 
equilibrium exist in financial markets. Moreover, bankruptcy costs and systemic price shocks 
amplify these externalities. We find that mitigating such distortions is possible with regulations 
that limit the risk appetite of banks depending on the state of economy. Our main conclusion is 




Moreover, combining this macroprudential policy with bailout guarantee also prevents 
bankruptcy costs and improves the social welfare more.   
On the policy side, we consider different forms of bailout policies. We show that in general, 
pure bailout policies raise the risk level in the economy. Bailout guarantees limit depositors’ 
monitoring power and they ask lower risk spreads for their deposits. Banks increase their 
leverage since their funding costs decrease. Excess risk taking depresses asset prices and 
profitability of banking sector in the future periods. Thus banks become vulnerable to systemic 
shocks.  
Using the similar framework, we also examine the policies that restrict lending in the 
economy. We find that policies with predetermined threshold levels for the leverage like the 
Basel criteria are not efficient. Such policy measures don’t help banks to internalize the costs of 
the risks. Instead, these measures define just an upper level for the choice of leverage. On the 
other hand, we show that bank can internalize the effects of their lending decisions with reserve 
requirements. Furthermore, prudential reserve requirement improves the social welfare more as 
its elastic structure provides a buffer against systemic shocks. Banks perceive the cost of lending 
higher during good states of the economy and limit their lending. In the bad states, low reserve 
requirements decrease the cost of lending for the banks and banks increase lending. Such a 
mechanism increases resistance of financial system to systemic shocks. Risk averse depositors 
also benefit from more stable economy.  
As an alternative policy choice, we combine bailout policy with prudential reserve 




Bailout policy prevents the bankruptcy costs in the economy. However it causes moral hazard 
problem among the banks. Prudential reserve requirement increases cost of lending and helps 
banks to internalize costs of their leverage decisions. This prevents the moral hazard problems in 
financial sector. Therefore, when we apply bailout policy and prudential reserve requirement at 
the same time, social welfare improves. 
In the last step, we extend our analysis by adding credit default swap (CDS) into our model. 
We show that CDSs with implicit government guarantee and bailout policies have similar 
effects. In both cases, banks don’t internalize the cost of excess lending and they increase the 
leverage. Therefore, agents’ welfare deteriorates. On the other hand, we show that when CDSs 
are issued by private banks without government guarantee, banks implicitly internalize cost of 
their excess lending due to higher prices of CDSs. Banks share the burden of idiosyncratic risk 
among themselves and such a mechanism limits their exposure to the uncertainties. Thus social 
welfare improves under the condition that systemic shocks are not big enough. However if the 
systemic shocks are big enough, such a CDS linkage can have contagious effects. Even banks are 



















































































































































































































































































































Table 2.1: Sensitivity Analysis (standard deviation=0.2) 
 
 








Dep. Bank Lev. Dep. Banker Lev. Dep. Banker Lev.
Baseline -99.8 0.04 22.7 -99.8 0.08 10.7 -99.8 0.09 9.5
α=0.3 -83.2 0.04 22.6 -83.2 0.08 10.6 -83.2 0.09 9.5
α
H
=0.1 -127.8 0.15 22.6 -127.8 0.19 10.6 -127.9 0.20 9.5
β=0.9 -38.4 0.04 22.6 -38.4 0.08 10.6 -38.5 0.09 9.5
ρ=0.7 -87.3 0.04 22.0 -87.3 0.08 10.4 -87.5 0.09 9.6
σ=0 (risk neutral) 9.4 0.04 22.5 9.3 0.08 10.4 9.2 0.09 9.2
σ=5 -16199.7 0.05 27.7 -15417.5 0.10 14.8 -14122.3 0.11 13.5
µ=0.1 -90.9 0.01 171.6 -91.8 0.06 17.9 -91.8 0.07 15.6
γ=0.2 -101.2 0.03 39.9 -101.0 0.07 18.1 -101.0 0.07 16.1
n
H
=1.5 -119.5 0.01 22.9 -118.3 0.04 10.2 -118.1 0.04 9.4
η=0.1 -102.4 0.16 24.1 -102.6 0.33 11.6 -102.0 0.34 11.2





Table 2.2: Sensitivity Analysis (standard deviation=0.2) 
 
 












Dep. Bank Lev. Dep. Banker Lev. Dep. Banker Lev.
Baseline -99.8 0.04 22.7 -94.6 0.01 90.9 -96.0 0.02 61.8
α=0.3 -83.2 0.04 22.6 -79.7 0.01 91.5 -80.6 0.02 61.5
α
H
=0.1 -127.8 0.15 22.6 -121.2 0.13 92.2 -123.3 0.14 61.8
β=0.9 -38.4 0.04 22.6 -36.3 0.01 92.2 -36.8 0.02 61.8
ρ=0.7 -87.3 0.04 22.0 -82.7 0.01 88.4 -83.9 0.02 59.9
σ=0 (risk neutral) 9.4 0.04 22.5 9.9 0.01 90.1 9.8 0.02 61.3
σ=5 -16199.7 0.05 27.7 -13374.1 0.01 112.3 -14433.8 0.03 76.0
µ=0.1 -90.9 0.01 171.6 -87.2 0.00 0.0 -91.9 0.02 168.1
γ=0.2 -101.2 0.03 39.9 -95.2 0.01 201.1 -96.8 0.02 112.5
n
H
=1.5 -119.5 0.01 22.9 -114.1 0.00 116.5 -115.9 0.00 67.3
η=0.1 -102.4 0.16 24.1 -96.8 0.05 63.1 -98.2 0.09 60.7





Table 2.3: Sensitivity Analysis (standard deviation=0.6) 
 
 














Dep. Bank Lev. Dep. Banker Lev. Dep. Banker Lev.
Baseline -535 0.003 28.8 -526 0.262 3.5 -526 0.262 3.5
α=0.3 -362 0.004 27.2 -360 0.242 3.4 -360 0.242 3.4
α
H
=0.1 -686 0.104 28.2 -674 0.363 3.5 -674 0.363 3.5
β=0.9 -137 0.003 28.1 -133 0.253 3.5 -133 0.253 3.5
ρ=0.7 -159 0.004 22.0 -161 0.262 3.1 -161 0.262 3.1
σ=0 (risk neutral) 45.2 0.00 26.8 33.5 0.2 1.2 33.5 0.2 1.2
σ=5 -2E+15 0.048 172.3 -4E+13 0.483 1264.5 -4E+13 0.483 1264.5
µ=0.1 -515 0.000 62.6 -523 0.264 3.5 -523 0.264 3.5
γ=0.2 -568 0.002 48.2 -558 0.234 4.4 -558 0.234 4.4
n
H
=1.5 -782 0.000 31.1 -661 0.145 2.3 -661 0.145 2.3
η=0.1 -559 0.010 50.1 -524 1.137 4.0 -524 1.137 4.0





Table 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis (standard deviation=0.6) 
 
 
Note: Baseline parameters are; α=0.35, αH=0.01, β=0.96, ρ=0.9, σ=2, µ=0.36, γ=0.3, nH=2, η=0.33 
 
Dep. Bank Lev. Dep. Banker Lev. Dep. Banker Lev.
Baseline -535 0.003 28.8 -520 0.000 24.4 -551 0.000 60.3
α=0.3 -362 0.004 27.2 -354 0.000 26.1 -371 0.001 57.7
α
H
=0.1 -686 0.104 28.2 -667 0.101 27.7 -714 0.109 60.6
β=0.9 -137 0.003 28.1 -133 0.000 27.7 -141 0.000 60.4
ρ=0.7 -159 0.004 22.0 -155 0.000 19.1 -164 0.001 45.5
σ=0 (risk neutral) 45.2 0.00 26.8 47.4 0.00 22.7 45.8 0.00 56.2
σ=5 -2E+15 0.048 172.3 -2E+15 0.000 164.6 -3E+15 0.006 389.7
µ=0.1 -515 0.000 62.6 -430.33 0.000 0.0 -658 0.012 0.0
γ=0.2 -568 0.002 48.2 -544.74 0.000 7.3 -580 0.000 97.9
n
H
=1.5 -782 0.000 31.1 -808 0.000 227.7 -872 0.000 129.8
η=0.1 -559 0.010 50.1 -532 0.000 0.9 -564 0.002 51.0








Chapter 3                                             
Leverage and Default Risk of Financial 




Financial intermediaries such as commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, etc. are 
crucial institutions in the effort to decrease inefficiency and risk in economy. The financial crisis 





the importance of banking regulations. Before 2008 global crisis, financial intermediaries 
innovated financial tools like derivatives to go around limitations of banking regulations. These 
innovations caused asymmetric information problems between depositors and financial 
intermediaries. Depositors lost their monitoring power over financial intermediaries. Thus 
financial intermediaries were able to choose high risk levels without paying any extra cost. As a 
result of such a financial market design without strict regulations, we faced with a global 
financial crisis. Therefore, to prevent possible future financial crises, it is essential to re-examine 
the effects of asymmetric information and the design of new regulations like stress tests.  
This paper investigates effects of depositors’ monitoring power on the financial institutions’ 
leverage decisions under different levels of asymmetric information.  In addition, we also 
analyze incentives of government to prevent asymmetric information with regulations such as 
stress tests.  The key contribution of the paper is to show analytically excessive risk taking 
behaviors of banks under different levels of imperfect monitoring in a model with bankruptcy 
costs.  
This paper develops a single period model with three types of agents; depositors, borrowers 
and bankers. Definition of banks in the model is wider and it includes financial intermediaries. 
Depositors invest in banks by insuring themselves against the default risk. They have standard 
debt contract with banks as defined in Williamson (1986). Verification of the state is costly as in 
Townsend (1979) and asymmetric information is ex-post on the realization of banks’ return. In 





default probability. In the extension of the benchmark model, different levels of asymmetric 
information and noises are introduced into depositors’ monitoring.   
Borrowers are the agents without endowment.  Their production depends on the inputs from 
borrowing and it has stochastic technology parameter.  This stochastic technology parameter is 
the source of uncertainty in the economy. We assume that banks have skills to monitor their 
borrowers, and thus, they have perfect information about the firms. Therefore, the debt contract 
is perfectly state contingent or equity debt. It is similar to assume that bankers own the firm 
against their debt. 
Bankers are the owners of the banks. They have endowments that could be used in banks’ 
operations as capital. Bankers’ problem is to choose the optimal deposit level for the banks. 
While deciding on the leverage ratio they also determine banks’ default probability. 
Banks are at the center of the model. Direct lending of depositors to borrowers is out of the 
equilibrium as banks have special skills to monitor borrowers and they prevent duplication of 
monitoring costs. Banks increase the efficiency in the economy but they are also fragile 
institutions. They are balance sheet constrained and they face with two types of risks due to this 
structure. The risks can be either from depositors such as bank run because of maturity mismatch 
or from borrowers like default of borrowers. The benchmark model is focused on the risk from 
borrowers.  
After analyzing the benchmark model, we add different levels of information asymmetries 





and bad. Level of asymmetric information depends on information set of the depositors about 
banks’ types. Banks ex-ante know their types but depositors don’t know. However, depositors 
might have information or beliefs regarding the distributions of loan returns of bank types. We 
show that if the bad type banks’ ratio is high in the economy with asymmetric information, 
depositors couldn’t detect these banks and there will be excess risk taking like the pre-crisis 
period of 2008 financial crisis. On the other hand, if good type banks’ ratio is high, depositors 
couldn’t reward the good type banks and aggregate lending will be below its potential due to lack 
of reliability to banks.  
After describing the analytic solutions of asymmetric information problems, we evaluate the 
efficiency and reliability of stress tests. Stress tests are used to prevent asymmetric information 
in financial markets. However, there are still questions about the incentives of governments to 
announce the real type of the banks. This paper analyzes government incentives under 
asymmetric information and maturity risk. We proved that under certain conditions, covering up 
stress tests’ results is the optimum decision for the governments.  
The model in this paper builds on the literature of macroeconomic models with financial 
intermediaries. Literature started with finite period models, focusing on the relationship between 
lender and entrepreneur. Townsend (1979) introduced costly monitoring problem. Then literature 
was separated into two different paths. First branch (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and Gale and 
Hellwig, 1985) concentrated on credit rationing in equilibrium while the other branch (Boyd and 





financial intermediaries. Diamond (1984) was the first study explaining the existence of banks. 
In his paper, banks are defined as delegated monitors and monitoring decisions are ex-ante. In 
the studies of Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986); agents are 
informed asymmetrically on the realization of projects and monitoring decisions are ex-post. 
Following work in the literature integrated specific financial contracts into the general 
equilibrium models with infinite periods. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) used information 
asymmetries in a general equilibrium framework by defining heterogeneous agents, specifically 
lenders and borrowers. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) presented a similar approach with the 
financial accelerator mechanism which limits the borrowers’ credit amount depending on their 
collateralized assets. Bernanke et al. (1999) added credit market frictions and asymmetric 
information into the dynamic general equilibrium model. Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003) 
explained in their book possible ways of setting up general equilibrium mechanism with a 
banking system.  
In this paper, different than the literature, we examine the effects of information 
asymmetries at various levels in the financial system with default costs. We evaluate the impacts 
of imperfect monitoring on banks’ behaviors using a single period model with bankruptcy costs.  
Moreover, we analyze government incentives to carry out unbiased stress tests in the similar 
analytical framework. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the benchmark model and 





describes their effect on the economy. Section 4 examines the reliability of stress tests by 
analyzing the government’s incentives and section 5 concludes. 




Depositors are the financer of the banks. They have initial endowment, Wd and their utility 
function is risk neutral Depositors have standard debt contract with the banks (Williamson, 
1984). They get interest rate rd, for each unit of deposit when banks do not default. When bank 
defaults, depositors get all the remaining capital of the bank and pay the bankruptcy cost. We 
define bankruptcy costs as monitoring and liquidation costs. In order to simplify problem, we 
assume depositors’ bankruptcy costs are large enough that depositors get nothing when the bank 
defaults. 
Depositors ask additional spread over risk free rate to insure themselves against the banks’ 
default risks. The participation constraint for the depositor is given by; 
dr (1- F(n)) = a%                                                                                                                     (3.1) 
where F(n)%  is the bank’s default probability1 and a is the risk free rate. Depositors can 
observe banks’ leverage ratio, and thus, they can estimate their default probability.  
                                                           
1








Borrowers’ initial endowment is zero. In order to produce, they need to borrow from banks. 
Their technology is assumed to be linear, y=nL. They use bank loans, L, as capital in their 
production. The productivity factor, n is continuously distributed over the interval nL, nH ⊆
ℝ	with uniform density function, f(n). Banks have perfect monitoring skills over borrowers. The 
contract between borrowers and the banks is assumed perfectly state contingent debt contract 
similar to issuing the equity for their debt. Borrowers transfer all their revenues to the banks due 





π = nLf(n)dn∫                                                                                                                    (3.2) 
3.2.3 Banks 
Banks are owned by the bankers who are risk neutral agents. Bankers have initial capital, W 
that is used as bank’s capital. In the single period model, bankers’ problem turns into the profit 
maximization problem of banks. In case of bank default, there is limited liability and the bankers 
lost only their shareholder rights. They don’t bear any additional bankruptcy cost in defaults.  
Banks are at center of the model as they are receiving deposits from the depositors and 
lending to the borrowers. Direct borrowing between depositors and lenders is out of the 





and this duplicates their monitoring costs. In addition, banks have better monitoring power over 
borrowers. Therefore, banks exist in the equilibrium. 
Banks increase efficiency in the economy but they are fragile institutions. They are balance 
sheet constrained and they should be solvent at all times. They face with two types of liquidity 
risks; maturity mismatch problem from depositors’ side and default risk from borrowers’ side. 
This study focused on the default risk from borrowers’ side. However, at the end of the paper, we 
also consider maturity risk. We define default risk like systemic risk. We assume borrowers’ 
returns are stochastic but perfectly correlated. It is similar to the relation between weather 
conditions and harvest. Weather conditions are stochastic. But, if the weather is bad, all farms’ 
harvests will decline. It is a systemic risk that prevents risk distribution ability of farmers like 
banks as it is observed in most of the crisis. 
Banks will default if they are insolvent. In order to avoid from defaults, their liabilities 
(deposit repayments) should be higher than the loan returns. Default constraint is given by: 
dnL-r D 0≥                                                                                                                            (3.3) 
Banks can put some portion of their deposits aside, referred as cash reserves. Cost of the 





problem, holding cash increases the default probability of the banks. Therefore, optimal level of 
cash reserves is zero in our model2. Thus banks lend all of the deposits and capital, W+D=L. 
There is a threshold level of productivity factor, n%  that makes the default constraint (3.3) 




%                                                                                                                              (3.4) 
If the realized productivity of borrowers is lower than the threshold level, banks’ revenues 
will not be adequate to pay liabilities and banks will default. Banks’ default probability is the 
cumulative distribution function of productivity at n% , F(n)% . Using the uniform distribution 





F(n)= ( -n )
n -n D+W
%                                                                                                     (3.5) 
Banks’ default rate is increasing with their deposit level and decreasing with their initial 
capital. Higher the deposits imply higher the loans and banks’ leverage. However, if the initial 
capital rises, it will pull down the leverage ratio and banks’ structure will be less risky.  
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 In most developed countries and US, there is no requirement for holding cash reserves. In US, cash reserve to 






3.2.4 Representation of Problem 
Banks maximize their profits subject to depositors’ participation constraint. Banks’ 






max  (n(D+W)-r D)f(n)dn                                                                                              (3.6)
s.t.





Depositors’ participation constraint is always binding. Banks’ participation constraint is 







We assume returns are attractive enough to convince bankers to borrow. Therefore, banks’ 
participation constraint is always satisfied and it can be ignored while solving the optimization 
problem. 
Assuming uniform distribution of returns, the banker’s first-order condition requires: 
d H
ddr n +nD+r -  = 0
dD 2
%





3.2.5 Solution of Model 
In order to have a solution for the optimization problem, there should be an interest rate that 
convinces depositors to put their money into the banks. Solution of the depositors’ participation 
constraint provides the conditions for existence of such an interest rate.  
Proposition 1: Participation constraint determines the feasible set of deposits in the bank’s 
optimization problem. Solution exists if there is an interest rate which satisfies depositor’s 
participation constraint for the given deposit demand of bank. 
(i) If nH ≥ n, for every D, there exists a feasible deposit interest rate.  
(ii) If nH < n, there exists an interest rate if and only if D∈0,D  
where D H 2
H L H 2
(n ) W
=
4a(n -n )-(n )
and n=2 a+aa-nL  
Proof: See Appendix E. 
Part (i) of proposition 1 implies that if the bank’s returns are high enough, depositors will 
accept an interest rate for each level of bank’s borrowing. When the bank’s returns are not high 
enough and the bank demands high deposits as given in part (ii) of proposition 1, depositors 
don’t want to lend at any interest rate due the high leverage levels and high default risk. In this 
case, depositors know that their loss in case of default will not be insured at any interest rate, and 





Proposition 2: Under appropriate parameters, there exists an interior solution for the bank’s 
optimization problem. Equilibrium deposit demand and interest rate are: 
H 2 H L
eq
H L H 2
2(n ) -4a(n -n )
D =W
4a(n -n )-(n )
                                                                                                  (3.8) 
eq H 2 H L
d
eq eq H
D +W (n ) -2a(n n )
r = ( )( )
D n
−
                                                                                    (3.9) 
Proof: (See Appendix F)  
Depositors’ monitoring limits bank’s leverage and profits. When the banks’ leverage 
increases, depositors face higher default rate and bankruptcy costs. Depositors reflect these costs 
to deposit interest rates. Therefore, borrowing cost of each additional unit of deposit is higher 
than the previous one and it makes bank’s profit function concave. Thus, banks’ optimization 
problem has interior solution.  
Proposition 3: Existence of interior solution for the bank’s optimization problem depends 
on the upper level of return per each loan, nH. If 	nH<	2 a+aa-nL, there will exist interior 
solution as given in proposition 2. Otherwise, solutions are corner solution: 
eq dD =W                                                                                                                            (3.10) 
d H d 2 H 2 d d H L
d
eq d




                                          (3.11) 
where Wd is the total savings of the depositors.  





Proposition 3 provides the conditions for the concavity of banks profit, and thus, interior 
solution to the optimization problem. If the return per loan is high enough, banks will borrow and 
lend all the funds in the economy which implies a corner solution for the optimization problem. 
3.3 Asymmetric Information 
In the benchmark model, there is not ex-ante heterogeneity among banks. In this section, in 
order to examine effects of asymmetric environment, different levels of information asymmetries 
are introduced into the benchmark model. Banks are differentiated into two groups with respect 
to their ability of generating returns from the loans. Bank’s type is ex-ante known by the bank 
but not by depositors.  
3.3.1 Perfect Information and Heterogeneous Banks 
Banks are classified into two groups, good and bad, according to their loan returns. Both 
types’ returns are randomly distributed but their distribution intervals are different. Return 
distribution of these types are given by:  
Good banks’ return: nG~ L HUniform n +s, n +s    





where s is a positive and constant number. In perfect monitoring, depositors know banks’ 
types, these types’ return distribution and distribution intervals before depositing. But depositors 
still don’t know return of specific bank. Therefore, solution process is similar to section 3.2. 
Under perfect information, depositors ask lower interest rates from good banks for the same 
level of borrowing. Good banks benefit from lower rates and borrow much more than bad banks. 
Therefore, their default risk becomes higher than bad types and they pay higher interest rates. 
Compared to bad types, good banks can afford high leverages because their loan returns are 
adequate to pay high interest rates.  
Proposition 4: Threshold return levels and deposit interest rates of good banks are higher 
than the bad banks under perfect information. 
G Bn >n% % and 
d G d B(r ) >(r )  
Proof: Solution process is similar to the optimization problem defined in section 3.2. The 
only change is in the upper and lower level of the returns. Using the results in proposition 2 and 
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n +s





n  = n -s-
n -s





Equation (3.12) and equation (3.13) implies that threshold return of good banks is higher 
than the bad banks. Using equations (3.1), (3.12) and (3.13), deposit interest rates are calculated 
as:  
H
d G n +s(r )  = 
2a
                                                                                                                   (3.14) 
H
d B n -s(r )  = 
2a
                                                                                                                    (3.15) 
Equation (3.14) is always higher than equation (3.15) and this shows that good banks pay 
higher interest rates than bad banks. 
Proposition 5: Under perfect information good banks borrow and lend more than bad 
banks. 
Proof:  Using equations (3.8), (3.12), (3.13), (3.14) and (3.15), equilibrium deposit levels of 
good and bad banks are calculated as: 
H 2
G
H L H 2
(n +s)
D =W( -1)
4a(n -n )-(n +s)
                                                                                        (3.16) 
H 2
B
H L H 2
(n -s)
D =W( -1)
4a(n -n )-(n -s)
                                                                                         (3.17) 





3.3.2 Imperfect Information and Heterogeneous Banks 
Perfect monitoring is an extreme assumption in the financial markets. Depositors don’t have 
full information set about the banks; therefore, they set expectations and beliefs about the types 
of banks. In this section, in order to examine the asymmetric information in the financial 
markets, we assume depositors have imperfect monitoring power. Depositors know that there 
exist bad and good banks. They also know return distributions of each type. But they don’t know 
which bank is good and which bank is bad type before depositing their money. 
Good and bad banks’ return distributions are same as in section 3.3.1. While depositing their 
money to a bank, depositors set expectations about bank’s type by giving equal probability to 
being good and bad. There is pooling for the banks’ types, and thus, good banks pay higher costs 
compared to perfect monitoring case. Therefore, good banks cut their optimal lending due to 
higher deposit interest rates. However, bad banks benefit from being in the same pool with good 
types. Imperfect monitoring covers up their riskiness, and hence, bad banks face with lower 
funding cost and raise their leverage. 
Proposition 6: Under imperfect monitoring, bad banks have higher leverage level and pay 
lower interest rate compared to perfect monitoring.  
B I B P B I B P d I d P
B B(D ) >(D ) ,    (n ) >(n ) ,    (r ) <(r )% %  
Proof: Since depositors can’t observe type of the banks, they give equal weight to being 








r ( (1- F (n))+ (1- F (n))) = a
2 2
% %                                                                                      (3.18) 
If we rewrite equation (3.18) by using the uniform distribution assumption, it will be similar 





max  (n(D+W)-r D)f(n)dn∫
%
                                                                                          (3.19) 
s.t. 
dr (1- F(n))  a≥%  
Solving the first-order condition of (3.19) yields: 
H H H L
B I
H
n (n -s)-2a(n -n )
(n )  = 
n -2s
%                                                                                            (3.20) 
If the optimization problem of bad banks is solved under perfect information, threshold 
return will be: 
H H H L
B P
H
(n -s)(n -s)-2a(n -n )
(n )  = 
n -s
%                                                                                      (3.21) 
Comparing equations (3.20) and (3.21) implies that threshold return of bad banks is higher 
under imperfect information.  This shows that bad type banks take more risk under imperfect 
monitoring. In order to compare deposit interest rates of bad banks, participation constraint is 
solved for the interest rates. Equation (3.18) can be rewritten as: 
d 2 H d H LD (r ) -n r +a(n -n )=0
D+W





Under perfect monitoring, participation constraint of bad banks given in equation (3.22) 
becomes: 
d 2 H d H LD (r ) -(n -s)r +a(n -n )=0
D+W
                                                                                    (3.23) 
Solutions of equations (3.22) and equation (3.23) are given by: 
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                                                                        (3.25) 
Comparison of interest rates is not straightforward. When heterogeneity in banking sector 
disappears, s=0, interest rates under perfect and imperfect monitoring become equal. Deposit 
interest rates’ derivative with respect to s is given by: 
d P H
B
H 2 H L
d(r ) D+W (n -s)
= (-1+ ) 0
ds 2D D











Signs of the derivatives imply that an increase in s raises the interest rates under perfect 
monitoring but it doesn’t change the rates under imperfect monitoring. Therefore, difference 
between two interest rates is increasing with s. Thus under imperfect monitoring: 
d I d P
B B(r ) <(r )  
Since threshold return level is higher and deposit interest rate is lower, deposits and leverage 
should be higher under imperfect monitoring. 
B I B P(D ) >(D )  
Proposition 7: Under imperfect monitoring, good banks’ leverage is lower and they pay 
higher deposit interest rate compared to perfect information case.  
G I G P G I G P d I d P
G G(D ) <(D ) ,    (n ) <(n ) ,    (r ) >(r )% %  
Proof: Solution is same as the proof of proposition 6. The only difference is upper and lower 
level of loan returns. If similar steps are followed: 
H H H L
G I
H
n (n +s)-2a(n -n )
(n )  = 
n +2s
%                                                                                           (3.26) 
H H H L
G P
H
(n +s)(n +s)-2a(n -n )
(n )  = 
n +s
%                                                                                    (3.27) 
Comparison of the equation (3.27) and (3.28) shows that 
G I G P(n ) <(n )% % . Derivative of the 







H 2 H L
d(r ) D+W n +s
= (1- ) 0
ds 2D D
(n +s) -4a(n -n )
D+W
<  
Explanation is similar to the proof of proposition 6. Negative sign of the derivative implies 
that the interest rates decrease with s under perfect monitoring. However, it stays constant under 
imperfect monitoring. Thus d I d PG G(r ) >(r )  and 
G I G P(D ) <(D ) . 
In this section, we showed that information asymmetry is important factor in lending 
decisions. Even small changes in the information sets of depositor and heterogeneity of banks 
can affect economy significantly. If weight of the bad banks is high in the economy, imperfect 
monitoring will cover up their riskiness, and thus, they will increase their leverage. This creates 
temporarily good economic environment with low rates and high lending which is similar to pre-
crisis period of 2008 financial crisis. In this scenario, depositors can’t insure themselves fully. 
This situation continues until the banks’ returns from their investments are realized and exact 
types of the banks are observed. When the returns are realized, banks’ default rate will be much 
higher than it should be under perfect monitoring due to excess risk taking. As a result, it will be 
the depositors paying the cost of such a temporary boom period and it will be the banks 
benefiting from imperfect monitoring. 
If the weight of good banks is higher in the economy, total lending will be lower and interest 
rates will be higher compared to perfect monitoring. Information asymmetry causes good banks 





banks’ profits declines. This situation is similar to what is happening in US and Europe after the 
2008 crisis. Governments are trying to use stress tests to prevent the information asymmetries 
and pooling effects. Efficiency of these solutions is examined in section 3.4.  
3.3.3 Extreme Imperfect Information 
In this section, we examine effects of extreme information asymmetries. The difference 
from previous sections is that depositors only know that there are two types of banks in the 
economy. They don’t have any information regarding return distribution of these types. They 
estimate the return distribution of all banks as; 
n~ L HUniform n -δ, n +δ    
where δ is a positive and constant noise parameter depending on depositors’ beliefs on 
banks’ returns. Therefore, when δ is getting larger, depositors’ monitoring power is decreasing 
and information asymmetry is increasing in the model. 
Solution of the model is similar to the solution in section 3.3.1. The only difference is in the 





r (1- F(n)) = r  = a
n -n +2δ
%
%                                                                                          (3.28) 
Solution of the optimization problem with new participation constraint yields the threshold 





H H H L
G EI
H
(n +δ)(n +s)-2a(n -n +2δ)
(n )  = 
n +2s-δ
%                                                                            (3.29) 
H H H L
B EI
H
(n +δ)(n -s)-2a(n -n +2δ)
(n )  = 
n -2s-δ
%                                                                              (3.30) 
Using equation (3.29) and (3.30), interest rates for both types of the banks are found as: 
d EI G EI
G
D+W
(r ) =(n )
D
%                                                                                                           (3.31) 
d EI B EI
B
D+W
(r ) =(n )
D
%                                                                                                            (3.32) 
Notice that, noise parameter, δ is like a blanket covering up the excess risk taking of the 
banks. Comparison of the extreme imperfect monitoring model with perfect monitoring model is 
more complex than the comparisons in the previous sections. There exist two effects, pooling of 
banks and noise in monitoring. These two effects might conflict for good banks depending on the 
banks’ risk appetite. Extreme imperfect monitoring punishes good banks by putting them into 
same basket with bad types. This increases good banks’ deposit costs. On the other hand, noise 
in monitoring rewards highly leveraged banks by covering up their excess risk taking behaviors. 
Therefore, a bank that is highly leveraged and good type might either gain or lose depending on 
which of these two effects is more dominant.  
Noise in monitoring punishes lowly leveraged banks. If a bank chooses to be safe with low 
leverage, it might end up with paying higher cost compared to perfect monitoring. Depositors’ 





such a case, even if it is almost impossible to default, depositors estimate higher default 
probabilities. Following propositions show the trade-offs between these two effects and compare 
them for both types of banks.  
Proposition 8: (Noise in monitoring) There exists a threshold return, eqn% , at which 
depositors estimate same default rate and ask same interest rate under extreme imperfect 
monitoring and perfect monitoring.  
EI eq P eqF (n )=F (n )% %  and d eq EI d eq P (r (n )) (r (n ))=% %  
If banks are highly leveraged, eqn>n% % , depositors will estimate lower default rates for these 
banks under imperfect monitoring compared to perfect monitoring. If banks are lowly leveraged,
eqn<n% % , depositors will assign higher default rates under imperfect monitoring.  
Proof:  Equal success rate of banks under imperfect and perfect monitoring yields: 
EI eq P eq1- F (n )=1- F (n )% %  
Solution of the equation for bad and good banks yields: 
H L H L
G eq s(n -n ) 2s+n +n(n )  = +  
2δ 2
%                                                                                      (3.33) 
H L H L
B eq s(n -n ) -2s+n +n(n )  = - +
2δ 2





Comparison of equation (3.33) and (3.34) implies 
B eq G eq(n ) (n )<% % . Simple example can 
explain the importance of eqn% . Assume a good bank is highly leveraged and has maximum level 
of risk under perfect monitoring. Its threshold return level is given by: 
Hn=n +s%  
In this scenario, since bank’s default probability is 1, depositors ask infinite interest rates. 
However, under imperfect monitoring, depositors’ belief about intervals of return distribution is 
wider. Therefore, depositors estimate that good bank’s default probability is lower than 1. Thus, 
highly leveraged good bank pays lower interest rate. Solving depositor participation constraint 
under imperfect monitoring yields deposit interest rate as: 
H L
d EI n -n +2δ(r )  = a  <
δ-s
∞  
Now assume a good bank is lowly leveraged and its risk level is given by: 




Deposit interest rate is 2a for this risk level under perfect monitoring. In imperfect 





(r )  = 2a  >2a
n -n +2δ-2s
 
Lowly leveraged bank pays higher interest cost under imperfect monitoring. Therefore, 





Proposition 9: (Pooling effect) Pooling effect works in favor of bad banks and against good 
banks.  
Proof: Assume banks have same risk level under perfect monitoring, 
P B P GF (n )=F (n )% % . In 
order to have same risk level in perfect monitoring, relation between the threshold returns should 
be: 
G Bn =n +2s% %  





1-F (n )= 
n -n +2δ
%








%                                                                                                   (3.36) 
Success rate of good banks in equation (3.36) is lower than the success rate of bad banks in 
equation (3.36). Depositors couldn’t differentiate type of the banks in extreme imperfect 
monitoring. They evaluate both banks using same return distribution. Therefore, even if both 
types of banks have same default risk under perfect monitoring, depositors estimate lower default 
risk for bad banks in extreme imperfect monitoring. Thus, depositors ask lower interest rates 
from bad banks compared to good banks.  
Proposition 10: As the noise in depositors’ monitoring increases, noise effect becomes 





banks don’t matter. Depositors estimate the same default rate for both types and ask the same 
interest rate.  
EI B EI G 1F (n )=F (n )=  
2
% %  
Proof: Using the success rate formula in depositor participation constraint (3.28) and taking 
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When noise parameter goes to infinity, depositors lose their monitoring power on banks’ 
returns and they estimate banks’ default rate like tossing coin. Therefore, both good and bad 
banks, whatever their risk level is, pay the same interest rate, 2a. Interest rates are independent of 
leverage due to lack of monitoring. In such extreme cases, both banks want to borrow all the 
money in the economy and they have maximum possible leverage. 
3.4 Government Incentives and Stress Tests 
In section 3.3, we show that information asymmetries and noises in monitoring induce 
excess risk taking among the bad banks. Moreover, we show that these asymmetries might cause 
inefficiently low lending among good banks. In order to prevent these asymmetries, governments 





whether governments have adequate incentives to run the tests appropriately and announce the 
real results. In this section, we examine situations in which it is optimal for the government to 
cover up stress tests’ results. 
Proposition 11: If the election time is before the realization of banks’ loan returns and ratio 
of bad banks are high in the economy, it will be optimal for the government to maintain 
asymmetric information. Short term governments’ optimal choice is either not to run stress tests 
or cover up their results.  
Proof: In section 3.3, we show that bad banks are able to increase their leverage under 
imperfect monitoring. If ratio of bad banks is high in the economy, there will be excess lending 
and temporary boom period until returns of banks’ investments are realized. Government can 
benefit from imperfect monitoring and high economic activity until elections as its popularity 
increases. If government announces type of banks before elections, lending will be cut and 
economic activity will slow down. This damages the government’s popularity in the public 
before the elections. 
Maintaining asymmetric information increases banks’ default rates due to excess risk taking. 
Since depositors couldn’t fully insure themselves in imperfect monitoring and banks have limited 





3.4.1 Government incentives under maturity mismatch 
Banks’ short term borrowings and long term investments cause maturity risk in their balance 
sheet all the time. Such maturity risks amplify problems regarding government incentives in 
stress tests. In order to analyze the effects of maturity risk on government incentives, we replace 
standard debt contract assumption between depositors and banks with variable debt contract. We 
assume interest rate on deposits is variable among maturity, similar to CDS (credit default 
swaps). Therefore, depositors can update interest rate depending on new information sets. On the 
other hand, banks’ hands are tied as they can’t change their borrowing amount. As a result, banks 
need to finance their short term debt each period with new interest rates. Thus, they are exposed 
to interest rate risks.  
In this section, we examine a model similar to the one presented in section 3.3.1 in three 
periods, t = 0, 1, 2. In period 0, banks borrow deposits, D with the interest rate, d0r  to finance 
their lending. Banks can’t change their deposit level until period 2. In period 1, depositors update 
deposit rates, d1r  with respect to their new information set. They recalculate their participation 
constraints. In period 2, banks’ loan returns are realized and they pay their debt. In this set up, 
question is whether it is optimal for government to run stress test and announce the results in 
period 1.  
Proposition 12: If the ratio of bad banks is high in the financial sector with maturity risk, 





Proof: If depositors learn the type of the banks in period 1, they will ask higher interest rates 
from bad banks which have already taken excess risk under imperfect economy at period 0. 
Since banks can’t re-optimize their deposit levels in period 1, their profits significantly decline 
and default rates rise to extremely high levels at the end of period 2. Banks pay the cost of excess 
risk taking. It also damages the economy since lending drops and government might need to bail 
out default institutions. Short term governments don’t choose this option. Instead they prefer not 
to run stress test or to run biased stress tests. In this case, default rates are lower in period 2. 
However, depositors are not able to insure themselves and they pay the cost of excess risk taking. 
Banks benefit from high leverages. Government prevents the high default rates and bail outs.  On 
the other hand, government loses its reliability and problems with asymmetric information 
mentioned in previous sections continue in the long term. But, since government is selected for 
short term, it ignores such long term damages. Open form of participation constraint in period 0 
is given by: 
d 2 H d H L
0 0
D
(r ) -n r +a(n -n )=0
D+W
                                                                                          (3.37) 
In period 1, if depositors learn that the banks are bad type, they will update the participation 
constraint as: 
d 2 H d H L
1 1
D
(r ) -(n -s)r +a(n -n )=0
D+W
                                                                                    (3.38) 
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Notice that interest rates in equation (3.39) and (3.40) are equal when banks are 




> . It implies that 
interest rate in period 1 is higher than the rate in period 0, d d1 0r r> , and difference is increasing 
with s. Higher s means lower return of bad banks. Therefore, bad banks’ extra interest rate cost 
in period 1 increases with s. As a result, such an increase in costs cause higher default rates at the 
end of period 2. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Banks are originally designed to decrease inefficiency and risks in the economy. However, 
during the 2008 crisis, they were the source of problems. They went around the regulations by 
using the innovations such as derivatives and they took excess risk. Depositors were not aware of 
the situation due to asymmetric information and noises in monitoring. This paper presents an 





asymmetric information with various levels imperfect monitoring. We use the single period 
model with bankruptcy costs to evaluate banks’ optimal decisions.  
We solve our model analytically under both perfect monitoring and imperfect monitoring 
with heterogeneous banks. We find that there are two effects shaping the decisions of banks, 
pooling effect and noise in monitoring. When depositors don’t know the type of the banks, they 
assign same probabilities to being in any type and this causes pooling effect. We show that 
pooling effect induces excess risk taking among bad banks and curbs good banks’ lending. If 
depositors don’t have exact information about banks’ return distributions, they will set up beliefs 
like adding a noise to their monitoring power. We show that noise in monitoring causes 
depositors to overestimate default risks of lowly leveraged banks and underestimate default risks 
of highly leveraged banks. Therefore, highly leveraged banks’ borrowing cost is lower compared 
to perfect monitoring case. As a result, noise in monitoring induces excess risk taking among the 
banks.  
Pooling and noise effects work in same direction for bad banks and encourage them to raise 
their risk level. However, their effects on good banks conflict. These results explain analytically 
banks’ behaviors before 2008 financial crisis. Before the 2008 crisis, due to lack of perfect 
monitoring over banks performance, especially bad type banks took excess risk.  
Although banks decreased their leverage after the 2008 crisis, depositors lost confidence to 
the banks. Governments used stress tests to prevent asymmetric information and to gain 





elected for short term and the bad banks is widespread in the economy, government doesn’t have 
any incentive to announce real type of the banks. Banks’ maturity mismatching problems banks 
amplify this result. If the government is forced to run such tests by public pressure, it will have 
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Figure 3.3: E of participation constraint when D>0 
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Appendix A: Solution of Decentralized Model 
A.1 Financial Contract 
Depositor’s participation constraint in financial constraint is always binding and at clears the 
market and equalizes total saving of depositors to total deposit demand from the banks, 
s
t t(1-η)d =ηd . Given qt+1, deposit interest rate (
d
t+1r ) is determined with this equation: 
D
t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1q l π =a d  





t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1
n
q l n - q l π  - µq l n f(n)dn = q l π∫
%
 
Financial contract is solved by banks by embedding depositor’s participation contract and 





t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1
l
n
max  q l n  - µq l n f(n)dn - a d∫
%
 
Assuming uniform distribution of f(n) implies the first order condition: 
t+1 L t+1 t+1
t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1
H L t+1
n  + n n  dn
 a  - q n  - µF(n ) -µl F(n ) =0
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Rewriting the first order condition: 
2 2 B
t+1 L t+1 t+1
t+1 t+1 t+1 B '
H L H L t+1
(n )  - (n ) n  π
FOC (l ):     a  - q n  - µ  + µ =0






The first order condition implies that n%  is the function of q and a. It doesn’t depend on bank 
capital, w. Also depositor’s participation constraint gives rd as function of n% . Therefore, all 
atomistic banks, regardless of their capital choose the same leverage and risk level, n% . 
In order to ensure that the solution is the maximum point in the domain, second order 
condition is examined. Second order condition is negative if: 
2
2t+1 t+1 t+1
t+1 t+1 t+1 2
t+1 t+1 t+1
dn dn d n











is small enough, the given condition holds and solution of the first order 
condition is the maximum point. 
A.2 Shareholders’ Problem 
Shareholders’ problem can be rewritten by embedding their budget constraint into their 






t t s s s s s+1 s
s=t s
l




Note that the leverage, ls/ws, is independent of initial capital ws. In the financial contract, we 
show that all atomistic banks choose the same leverage and risk level, n% , regardless of their 
initial capital. Thus, internal return rate, ρt is not a function of ws: 
B s
s s s s
s
l
ρ  = q π l
w
 





FOC (w ):     q π
βγ w
=  
A.3 Depositors’ Problem 
We assume depositors invest in all banks to insure themselves against idiosyncratic 
uncertainty among banks. The average return of depositor from bank deposits is calculated by 
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where index j represents each atomistic bank, and index i represents each depositor. si,j,td  is 





contract, we show that banks are similar in terms of risk and leverage. Since the depositors are 
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t t t t t t t t t
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where Lt is the total lending and Dt is the total deposits in the economy. Since all banks have 
same leverage, average bank’s leverage is equal to the leverage level of overall banking industry.  
Depositor maximizes its utility, equation (1.5), subject to budget constraint, equation (1.6). 
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%                                                (A.1) 
2 L 2 B
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(n ) -(n ) n π
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2(n n ) n n π
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 − − 
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(A.8) 
H H1-α-α αα-1
t t t tq =αθ (K ) (H ) (η)                                                                                                
(A.9) 
t tH =(1-η)h                                                                                                                        (A.10) 
t tK =ηnl                                                                                                                             
(A.11) 
D B
t t t t t t t+1Y =(1-η)c ηc +ηF(n )µq l ηl+ +%                                                                               (A.12) 
s
t t(1-η)d =ηd                                                                                                                       
(A.13) 
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A.5 Steady State Equations 
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D lw=(a-qπ )
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Appendix B: Existence and Uniqueness of 
Decentralized Equilibrium  
In Appendix B, we prove existence of solution in the decentralized model. We also 
determine conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium. In order to prove existence of 
equilibrium, showing existence of fixed point (steady state) where economy converges is 
adequate. According to the steady state equations in Appendix A.5, all other variables of the 
model are one-to-one function of asset price, q, and threshold risk level, n% . Therefore, proving 
the existence and uniqueness of threshold risk level and asset price implies the existence and 
uniqueness of equilibrium.  
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In this equation, we write asset prices as one-to-one function of threshold risk level, n% . The 
next step of proving the existence of equilibrium is the derivation of n% . The shareholder’s 






Assumption of uniform distribution implies: 
L




(1-µ)(n  - (n ) ) + 2(n  - n)n
π = (1-µ)nf(n)dn+(1-F(n))n = 
2(n  - n )∫
%
% % %
% %  
Embedding this equation into shareholder’s inter-temporal equation yields: 
H 2
H L 2 L 2 H
1 qa(n  - n)





If the q is replaced with its functional form, second order polynomial equation of threshold 
risk level is obtained: 
2 H H L L 2 H 2(1+µ-γ)n - 2(n (1+µ/2-γ))n + 2(n  - n )n + (n )  - γ(n )  = 0% %  











%  and H2n =n%  
Second root of the equation is eliminated, since bank’s profit is zero at this root and also 
shareholder’s inter-temporal equation is not well defined and not satisfied. Therefore, the only 







As a result, we prove that solution for threshold risk level exists and it is unique. As asset 
price function and other variables are one-to one function of threshold risk level, it implies that 











Appendix C: Solution of Planner’s Problem 
with Full Capability 
The complexity with planner’s problem is the choice of objective function, as there are two 
agents; shareholders and depositors. In order to simplify the problem, we assume planner’s goal 
is to maximize depositor’s utility while keeping shareholder’s lifetime utility same as the 
decentralized equilibrium level. Utility constraint of shareholders: 
B B DEU (U )≥  
This constraint is always binding in the problem of planner with full capability. Constraint is 
rewritten as: 
B Bc  = c  when B B DEU  = (U )  
where Bc  is the constant consumption level of shareholders to ensure their lifetime utility 
level in decentralized equilibrium. Replacing the utility constraint, planner solves the 
Lagrangian: 
H H1-α-α αt+s D α D B
t t s s s s s s s+1
s=t
L  = E (β) u(c ) +λ (θ (nηl ) H η -(1-η)c -ηc -ηl )
∞
  ∑  





H H1-α-α αD D -σ α α-1
t t+1 t t+1 t+1FOC :     η β E (c / c ) αθ (nη) H η l =    
Budget constraint, production technology and first order conditions constitute planner 
optimality conditions and steady state equations. 
Planner’s (Full Capability) Optimality Conditions:  
H H1-α-α αD D -σ α α-1
t t+1 t t+1 t+1η β E (c / c ) αθ (nη) H η l =                                                                     (C.1) 
H H1-α-α αα α D B
t t t t t+1θ (nη) H η l  - (1-η)c  - ηc  - ηl  = 0                                                                    
(C.2) 
t+1 t tlogθ  = ρlogθ +ε                                                                                                             
(C.3) 
t tK =ηnl                                                                                                                               
(C.4) 
H H1-α-α αα
t t t tY  = θ (K ) (H ) (η)                                                                                                 
(C.5) 
H H1-α-α αα-1
t t t tq =αθ (K ) (H ) (η)                                                                                                
(C.6) 
Planner’s (Full Capability) Steady State Equations: 
θ=1 and a=1/β
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H H1-α-α αα α B
D θ(nη) H η l  - ηc  - ηl c  = 
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H H1-α-α αα-1q = αθK H η
                                                                                                         
(C.12) 
Since these functions have unique solutions in the given domain, solution to the planner’s 






Appendix D: Solution of Planner’s Problem 
with Restricted Capability 
Social planner with restricted capability doesn’t have any control on depositor’s problem 
and it is constrained with the financial contract. Therefore, social planner’s goal is to maximize 
banks’ profit while keeping utility of depositors at least indifferent. 
Considering the optimization problem of restricted planner, if the utility constraint of 
depositors ( D D DEU (U )≥ ) is not binding, solution will be interior solution otherwise it will be 
corner solution. 
D.1 Existence of Equilibrium in Interior Solutions 
Solution of restricted planner’s problem while depositor’s utility is not binding is similar to 
the solution of decentralized economy. Optimality conditions and steady state equations are same 
as the equations in Appendix A.4 and A.5. The only difference is the first order condition of 
financial contract. We can rewrite it for restricted planner as: 
t+1
2 L 2 B
S t+1 t+1 t+1
t+1H L H L B '
t+1
(n ) -(n ) n π
αq (n-µ +µ ) a












H L H L B'
π(n) -(n ) n
αq (n-µ +µ ) a





All other equations are similar to the equations in decentralized solution. The way of 
proving existence of equilibrium is also similar. Uniqueness of threshold risk level and asset 
price implies the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Considering the new optimality 





µ(n ) -µn n
α n+






Using the new form of the asset price function, the new equation for threshold of risk level 
is obtained as: 
2 H H L L 2 H 2(1+µ-γ)n - 2(1+µα/2-γ)n n + 2α(n - n )n + (1-µ+αµ)(n )  - γ(n )  = 0% %  










%   
Since α and µ are defined between 0 and 1, inside of square root is always positive and 
solution for threshold risk level always exists. Uniqueness of the equilibrium depends on the 





paper, one of the solutions for n% is always greater than nH and this solution is not feasible. 
Therefore, solution is unique.  
D.2 Existence of Equilibrium in Corner Solutions 
Considering the binding utility constraint of depositors, there exists a consumption level 
which keeps depositors indifferent, such as 
D Dc  = c  where 
DEU = U  
If the utility constraint is binding, it implies that planner’s optimal choice of leverage is too 
low for depositors. Low lending means high prices and lower wages in the future. Therefore, 
social planner should deviate from its optimum decision by increasing the leverage. There exists 
a parameter, αˆ , for each Dc  which forces planner to choose a higher leverage level and converts 
planner’s solution into an interior solution. Notice that α is replaced with αˆ  only in first order 





µ(n ) -µn n
αˆ n+






The new form of optimization problem doesn’t have binding constraints. However, its 
solution is still in the feasible set of the previous form of problem, optimization problem with 





with binding constraints. The rest of the proof is similar to the one in the interior solution 
section.  
D.3 Proof of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Second order condition of the financial contract in restricted planner’s problem is negative. 
Its proof is similar to the proof in Appendix A.1 The negativity of the second order condition 
implies that social planner’s solution is the optimum for the bank profits. Bank profits in 
restricted planner’s solution are higher than the profits in decentralized solution, and thus, 
shareholders are pareto better in restricted planner’s solution. Restricted planner improves bank 
profits by lowering leverage and default rates, and so, increasing the steady state levels of asset 
prices. 
While solving the model, second order approximation methodology is chosen to take into 
account volatility of variables in utilities. Second order approximations of depositor’s expected 
utility around the steady state in social planner (SP) and decentralized equilibrium (DE) are 
given by:  
SP SP SP SP SP 2 SP
cE(u(c )) u(c ) + u (c )E(c-c ) 1/2u (c )(σ )′ ′′≈ +  
DE DE DE DE DE 2 DE





where c  is the consumption at the steady state and 2cσ  is the variance of consumption 
around the steady state levels. The source of volatility in the consumption is the variance of 
shocks and there is direct mapping ( 2 2cσ σ→% % ). If there is no aggregate uncertainty in the model, 
utility of agents will be equal to the steady state utility level, u(c) . Since there is stochastic 
environment and depositors are risk averse, second and third terms in the utility equations will 
not be equal to zero. 2cu (c)E(c-c) 1/2u (c)σ′ ′′+  is the effect of the stochastic consumption on 
agents’ utility functions.  
Restricted planner’s solution has two different effects on depositors’ utility. The first effect 
is on steady state levels of depositor’s consumption. Low supply of capital goods decreases 
wages and it causes a direct decrease in steady state values of depositors’ consumption in 
planner’s problem (
DE SPu(c ) u(c ) > 0− ). The second effect is regarding the stochastic 
consumption. In stochastic environment, low default rates of banks allow them to accumulate 
more capital in the long run compared to competitive equilibrium. Therefore, even with low 
leverage, banks can lend more in planner’s problem. Moreover, banks have more robust structure 
in planner’s problem. Therefore, volatility in depositors’ deposit returns is lower. As a result, 
negative contribution of stochastic environment in social planner’s problem is limited compared 
to its effects in decentralized equilibrium: 
SP SP SP 2 SP DE DE DE 2 DE
c c
1 1
u (c )E(c-c ) u (c )(σ ) >u (c )E(c-c )+ u (c )(σ )
2 2







A = u (c)E(c-c) u (c)(σ )
2





These results are supported with the simulation results given in Figure 1.10, Figure 1.11 and 
Figure 1.12.  
There exist a threshold level of variance of shocks, 2σ% , which equates utility loss at steady 
state (left side of equation) to gains from choosing low risk levels (right side of the equation): 
DE SP SP SP DE DE SP 2 SP DE 2 DE
c c
1
u(c ) u(c ) u (c )E(c-c )-u (c )E(c-c )+ u (c )(σ ) - u (c )(σ )
2
′ ′ ′′ ′′ − =    
If variance of shock is higher than this threshold level, the right side of the equation will be 
higher than the left side. Therefore, social planner’s solution will be better off for depositors and 
there will be interior solution to the planner’s problem. As bankers are also pareto better, 
decentralized equilibrium is not constrained efficient. Simulations in Figure 1.10 show that 
threshold level of variance of shocks is 0.35 under benchmark calibration. Simulations in Figure 
11 also supports that both agents will be pareto better in planner’s problem if variance of shocks 
are greater than this threshold level. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Proposition 1 implies that if the variance of shocks is higher than the threshold level, 





better. Proposition 2 generalizes the inefficiency of decentralized equilibrium and claims that 
even if the variance of shock is lower than the threshold level, planner can always choose pareto 
better allocations.  
The first step in proof of proposition 2 is to show that regardless of variance of shocks, a 
marginal cut in lending make depositors better off in decentralized equilibrium. Such a marginal 
decrease in lending causes infinite small decline in steady state consumption, 
DEc : 
DE DE DE DEc   c - dc   and   u(c )  0≈ ∆ ≈  
But the contribution of aggregate shocks in depositors’ utility, ADE, is more sensitive to such 
a decline in lending as it leads to more robust banking sector. Combining these results yield: 
DE A >0 , l 0∆ ∆ < and DE DEA u(c )∆ > ∆  
Considering the second order approximation of depositors’ utility in the proof of proposition 





As a result, after a marginal cut in lending, depositors are better off. The second step is to 
show that bankers’ are also pareto better. Appendix D.2 shows that we can generate a marginal 
cut in banks’ lending by transforming optimization problem. If choose an α slightly smaller than 
1, we can marginally cut banks’ lending in decentralized equilibrium. In addition, optimization 





Appendix D.1 proves the existence of maximum point for such problems. Therefore, this shows 
that shareholders’ can increase their utility by cutting their lending in decentralized equilibrium 







Appendix E: Depositor Participation 
Constraint 
E.1 Existence of Solution 
Depositors’ participation condition can be rewritten as:  
da =r
θ
                                                                                                                                   (E.1) 





θ= (n - )
n -n D+W
. Figure 3.1 displays the 
importance of θ for the existence of solution to the participation constraint. If the θ is smaller 
than a threshold level, equilibrium interest rate will not exist. It implies that depositors don’t 
accept to deposit their money, since banks’ default probability is too high. Open form of 
equation (E.1) is written as: 
d 2 H d H LD (r ) -n r +a(n -n )=0
D+W
                                                                                           (E.2) 
Equation (E.2) is a second order polynomial equation. Condition to have a real solution is 
given by: 
H 2 H LD(n ) 4 a(n -n ) 0
D+W





Equation (E.3) is binding at the threshold level of deposits, D  that is critical to determine the 
solutions: 
D H 2
H L H 2
(n ) W
=
4a(n -n )-(n )  
If upper level of returns are higher than a critical level, $Hn >n where $
Ln 2 a+ a(a-n ) =
  , 
threshold level of deposits will be always negative, D < 0. Figure 3.2 displays the graphical 
explanation of this condition. Notice that hyperbole denotes ∆ of equation (E.2) and it intersects 
x axis when deposits are at the threshold level, D. In Figure 3.2, it is clear that D < 0 and upper 
side of hyperbole never intersects x axis. Thus, ∆ is greater than zero for all D>0. It means that 
there is always a real solution to interest rate equation. Thus, there exists a market clearing 
interest rate for all levels of deposit demands, D. 
If upper level of returns are lower than a critical level $Hn n< , threshold of deposits will be 
always positive, D ≥ 0. Figure 3.3 shows the graphical explanation of this condition. Hyperbole 
denotes ∆ and it intersects x axis at the threshold of deposits, D=D . In this case, ∆ is greater than 
zero when deposit demand is lower than the threshold level, D<D . It implies that if banks 
demand high level of deposits and their return level is not high enough, depositors won’t lend 






There exist two solutions for the participation constraint in equation (E.2). Figure 3.4 
displays the graphical representation of the solutions. It shows that there are two roots and 
smaller one is the stable root. Analytical solution for the smaller root is given by: 
H 2 H 2 H L
d
part




                                                     (E.4) 







Appendix F: Solution of Bank’s Optimization 
Problem 
F.1 Interior Solution 
Banks’ profit function is concave when upper level of loan returns are smaller than the 
threshold level, 
H Ln <2 a+ a(a-n ) 
 
. Appendix E shows that when 
H Ln <2 a+ a(a-n ) 
 
, 
depositors will lend if banks’ deposit demand is lower than the threshold level, D<D . Therefore, 
solution of the banks’ optimization problem will be an interior solution if deposit demand is 
lower than the threshold level,	D . 
In order to solve bank’s first order condition (3.7), derivative of interest rate with respect to 
deposits should be computed. Taking derivative of depositor participation constraint (E.2) with 




dD ((D+W)n 2r D)(D+W)
=
−
                                                                                       (F.1) 
Using equation (F.1), first order condition (3.7) can be rewritten as:  
d 2 H H H 22D(r ) +(-2Wn -3Dn )+(n ) (D+W)=0                                                                          (F.2) 





d 2 H d H LD+W(r ) = n r -a(n -n )
D
                                                                                              (F.3) 
Combining equation (F.2) and (F.3) yields the deposit interest rates as a function of 
deposits: 
H 2 H L
d
H






                                                                                        (F.4) 
In Appendix E, solution of depositor participation constraint given in equation (E.4) also 
defines the interest rates as function of deposits. Combining equation (E.4) and (F.4) gives the 
solution for the deposits:  
H 2 H H L
eq
H L H H 2 H
(n ) (n +1)-4a(n -n )
D =W
4a(n -n )(n +1)-(n ) (n +1)
                                                                            (F.5) 
Since this optimum solution is always lower than the threshold level, Deq<D , when
H Ln <2 a+ a(a-n ) 
 
, optimum solution will be an interior solution  
F.2 Corner Solution 
In the previous section, we prove that optimum solution is interior solution when
H Ln <2 a+ a(a-n ) 
 
. But if the upper level of banks’ loan returns are higher than the threshold 
level, 
H Ln >2 a+ a(a-n ) 
 
, banks profit function won’t be concave and banks will demand all 





depositors’ participation constraint determines the solution. If banks returns are high enough for 
repayment, depositors can lend any available amount with appropriate interest rate, as shown in 
Appendix E. Depositors’ endowment becomes the upper limit for the borrowing amount of 
banks. Replacing D=Wd in equation (E.2) yields the corner solution for the model: 
d H d 2 H 2 d d H L
d
d




                                            (F.6) 
